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Abstract  
 This thesis is aimed at investigating the neurobiology underlying individual variation 
in human value orientation. In over 80 nations, human values have been investigated under 
the framework of the circumplex model of human values (Schwarz, 1992). The present 
research probes specific biological markers of the human values described in this model, 
including macrostructural and microstructural properties of the human brain, brain activation 
and genetic components.  
  The first section of the thesis investigates human values in the context of behavioural 
genetics. The motivation of this research is to identify the genetic representation of human 
values. To this end, I utilized knowledge in personality genetics to investigate an association 
between values and a specific genetic component: the polygenic neuroticism score. The 
results indicated that the polygenic neuroticism score was associated with individual 
differences in human values in a sinusoidal manner that is consistent with Schwartz’s (1992) 
model of values. These results suggest that it is useful to consider human values in analyses 
of genetic contributions to personality traits. 
The second section of the thesis describes two studies aimed at identifying the 
neurostructural basis of values. Specifically, this first study aimed at identifying the neural 
substrates that account for individual variation in the values assessed within Schwartz’s 
model. This individual variation was reflected in both macrostructrual (volume) and 
microstructural (myelin volume fraction) properties of brain white matter. The second study 
focused on a specific type of human values: hedonism values.  It aimed at identifying the 
neurostructural link between hedonism and reward-related processing. The results provided 
evidence of a “hedonic hub” in the human brain by delineating how an intricate network of 
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structures is associated with hedonism.  These findings establish the first neurostructural link 
between hedonism values and the classical neurobiological pathways of the reward circuitry.   
Building on the previous section, the last chapter investigates the effect of human 
values on reward-related processing in the context of economic decision making and self-
interest. Participants made foraging decisions for themselves and for a charity of their choice 
in two different foraging paradigms. Across both foraging tasks, self-focused individuals, 
compared to social-focused individuals, obtained more rewards when foraging for themselves 
than when foraging for others. This evidence reveals a dynamic interplay between an 
evolutionarily entrenched decision making system and the higher order belief system of 
individuals.  
Taken together, these findings provide new information helping to delineate the 
biology of values. They also pave the way for a more detailed explanation of 
psychopathological syndromes such as neuroticism and anhedonia in major depression.  
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
The world “value” has at least two sub-definitions. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary of English, it can denote “the material or monetary worth of something” and “the 
principles or standards of behaviour, one’s judgment of what is important in life” (Soanes & 
Stevenson, 2003). The former meaning relates to the study of values in the context of 
neuroeconomics, while the latter meaning relates to the study of values in the social cognitive 
context of culture, political ideology, morality, and attitudes. The present thesis is primarily 
focused on the latter definition. However, the last experimental chapter on economic decision 
making attempts to investigate the interplay between the two kinds of values. 
 
1.1. Human Values.   
1.1.1. The progression of value models  
Human values are regarded as part of the psychological foundations for ethical 
behaviour and a crucial element in social functioning (Turiel, 1983).  Allport’s and 
colleagues (Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1960) seminal “Study of values” proposed six value 
types, representing the kind of future activity that one wishes to perform (e.g., “social” values 
entail helping people and occupations such as social work, whereas “theoretical” values 
involve the search for truth and occupations such as scientific study). Subsequent theories 
emphasized that values should be assessed as idealized standards that have an ‘‘ought’’ 
character, rather than a mere assessment of subtle likes and dislikes toward activities and 
occupations. For example, Rokeach (1973) developed a list of 36 values, such as freedom, 
equality, and broadmindedness.  He asked people to rank them in terms of their importance, 
finding that the relative differences in value importance are more psychologically meaningful 
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than the importance of any single value on its own. However, an important missing element 
in these accounts of value orientations was the omission of predictions about relations 
between values. 
 
1.1.2. Schwartz’s Circumplex Model  
The relations between values are the central feature of the most widely used model of 
values at this time: Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model and its closely linked successor 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). Schwartz’s (1992) model posits the existence of 10 value types 
(Figure 1, Panel A), with each expressing motives that can be discerned from Multi-
Dimensional Scaling (MDS) analyses of responses to 56 separate values. These motives are 
organized along two main dimensions. One dimension contrasts motives to promote the self 
(self-enhancement) against motives that transcend personal interests (self-transcendence), 
while the other dimension contrasts motives to follow the status quo (conservation) against 
motives to pursue personal intellectual and emotional interests in uncertain directions 
(openness). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
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Figure 1.1. A. The circumplex structure of personal values (modified from Schwartz, 1992). 
B. Plot of hypothesized relationships between three external variables (A, B, C) and the 10 
values (SD= Self-direction, ST=Stimulation, HE=Hedonism, AC=Achievement, PO=Power, 
SE=Security, CO=Conformity, TR=Tradition, BE=Benevolence, UN=Universalism). Each 
dot point could represent a correlation coefficient (adapted from Schwartz 1992). 
 
 Compared to other models, Schwartz’s theory has received extensive validation 
(Schwartz, 1992). By building on the idea of the motivational continuum, a revised version of 
the theory “partitions the continuum into a finer set of meaningful, conceptually distinct 
values with greater universal heuristic and predictive power” (Schwartz et al., 2012). This 
revised version containing 19 value types, but subsumes the same higher-order dimensions as 
the earlier model and the same predictions about patterns of relations between values and 
external values (Schwartz et al., 2012).  In fact, these dimensions are apparent in patterns of 
interrelations between the value types across samples from over 70 nations (Schwartz et al., 
2012).     
The extensive cross-cultural support may imply that values express motives that have 
been evolutionarily conserved. Relevant to this possibility, one characteristic feature of the 
circumplex model of values is that it makes specific predictions about sinusoidal associations 
between values and external variables. In other words, if the values are ordered according to 
their positions along the value circle, then an external variable that is positively related to a 
particular value type should manifest lower positive correlations with adjacent values and an 
opposing relation with the opposing value type.  This pattern should follow a sine wave, 
similar to those shown in Figure 1B.  
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This prediction has indirectly received support in many studies that have sought 
evidence that values at opposite ends of the circumplex model exhibit opposing relations to 
other judgments and behavior.  This approach is less precise than methods specifically 
looking at sinusoidal tests of patterns of associations between values and other variables, 
because it focuses only on the opposing ends of each dimension and not on the correlations in 
between.  Nonetheless, one study has recently found evidence of a sinusoidal pattern in 
relations between values and personality traits in an analysis that considered correlations 
across all the values (Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015). In particular, the personality 
trait openness to experience was positively associated with the value types stimulation and 
self-direction and negatively associated to the value types conformity, tradition and security.  
This pattern supports the model’s assumptions about latent motivational conflicts, 
and, together with evidence of genetic contributions (Knafo & Spinath, 2011; Schermer, 
Vernon, Maio, & Jang, 2011), suggests that some aspects of human value orientation are 
entrenched in biological traits.  Therefore, this circumplex model of values offers a suitable 
avenue for probing the neurobiology of human values.  
 
1.2. Social Psychology and Social Cognitive Neuroscience  
As introduced above, human values were initially conceptualized in the field of social 
psychology, which is “an attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” (Allport, 
1985). However there has been an increasing realization from the researchers studying social 
psychological behavior of the importance of biological studies. The importance of biological 
studies in social psychology is underscored by several general principles (Cacioppo et al., 
2000). The first principle, the multiple determinism, posits that most if not all social 
phenomena are multiply determined, including biological apart from social determinants. For 
5 
 
example a number of important social phenomena including morality, anger, fear, social 
propriety and sexuality have been shown to have direct biological determents including 
lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala (Damasio, 1994; Macmillan, 1986; 
Klein & Kihlstorm, 1998). Therefore, focusing exclusively on social determinants in isolation 
when investigating a social phenomenon, could hinder the discovery of associations and 
interactions among the social and biological determinants (Cacioppo et al., 2000). Another 
general principle is the reciprocal determinism, which suggest that there are mutual 
influences between microscopic (e.g., biological) and macroscopic (e.g., social) factors in 
determining social phenomena and behaviour. For instance, Zillmann (1984) demonstrated 
that the sympathetic arousal in males is influenced when they are exposed to violent and 
erotic material and most importantly this level of arousal has a reciprocal effect on how they 
perceive sex and aggression. These results, again, suggest that is it difficult to provide a 
comprehensive account of social behaviours if either the biological or social levels of 
organization are considered unnecessary or irrelevant. The present thesis embraces these 
principles and aims, though social psychological and biological methodologies, to provide a 
more comprehensive account of human values by utilizing the most recent technical and 
methodological developments including functional brain imaging, and genetic techniques. 
As a result, despite initially being studied mainly in the context of social psychology, 
many human value-related social psychological phenomena including altruism, trust and 
cooperation, are now being explored in a multi-disciplinary approach, within social cognitive 
neuroscience. 
The emergence of this relatively recent field has been “an attempt to understand and 
explain, using the methods and theories of neuroscience (Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI), functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) , Electroencephalography (EEG), 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and genetics (twin studies and Genome Wide Association 
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Studies in particular), how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals are influenced 
by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” (Ward, 2012). It was initially 
introduced by Cacioppo and Berntson in 1992 as the “Social psychological contributions to 
the decade of the brain: Doctrine of multi-level analysis.” This approach recognizes that 
psychological phenomena/processes can be explained at multiple levels: at the 
cultural/societal, personal, brain, cellular and molecular. The field of social psychology 
focuses particularly on the cultural/societal and personal level by explaining psychological 
phenonomena in terms of inter-group processes, group processes, social interactions and 
encounters, personality traits of the individual etc. Neuroscience on the other hand focuses on 
the brain, cellular and molecular levels, by explaining psychological phenomena in terms of 
neural circuits, neurons, chemicals and genes.  
The pivotal aim of social cognitive neuroscience has been to create bridges between 
these different levels of explanation (Ward, 2012).  Creating bridges across these different 
levels of explanation can be beneficial to both social psychology and neuroscience for a 
number of important reasons, including the explication of psychological mechanisms and 
theoretical development.  This thesis aims to take advantage of both of these benefits in the 
context of human values.  
Firstly, most psychological processes (such as altruistic giving) are usually comprised 
of several sub-processes often occurring in close temporal proximity or even simultaneously 
(Lieberman, 2010). To be able to explain and predict a given psychological process, the 
psychological researcher needs to be able to clarify the nature of the underlying sub-
processes and the relationships between them. However, it is often a difficult task to outline 
all the specific psychological computations of psychological process if one merely employs 
the knowledge and tools of a single discipline (e.g., social psychology). On the other hand, 
years of neuroscience research have resulted in the insight that a great number of processes 
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that are directly related to human values, such as calculations of reward and punishment, pain 
and pleasure, mentalizing, delaying gratification and emotion regulation, are implemented by 
specific brain systems (Lieberman, 2010). Social psychology can utilize this neuroscientific 
knowledge to produce inferences about the specific sub-processes of a multi-dimensional 
psychological phenomenon. For example, if a group of individuals exhibits more benevolent 
behavior than another group, there may be a number of psychological sub-processes (e.g., 
individual differences in the ability to understand others or in the subjective liking of 
donating money to others) that are connected to these behavioral differences. Teasing apart 
putative psychological mediators is often difficult when looking at a gross behavioral 
measure, such as total amount of money given to charity or reaction times, metrics that are 
usually recorded by a social psychologist. However, these putative psychological 
computations can be interrogated by examining whether such behaviors are related to brain 
regions or pathways that are particularly associated with the ability to understand the 
emotions of other people or the subjective liking of donating money to others or even both. 
All in all, the tool of neuroimaging can aid the psychological scientist to interrogate 
simultaneous psychological processes which are often hard to interrogate otherwise. 
However, it is important to note that despite the potential insights for employing such 
methodologies, this “reverse inference” approach (i.e., where the engagement of a particular 
cognitive process is inferred from the activation of a particular brain region) has been shown 
to be problematic especially when the selectivity of the region in question cannot be 
established or is known to be weak (Poldrack, 2006).  
  Second, applying neuroscience methods to the study of human values can help to 
update social psychological models, like Schwartz’s circumplex model of values. For 
example, psychological processes that were traditionally thought of being distinct, such as 
social vs physical pain, or social vs physical reward or even social vs physical disgust, are 
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now understood to be underpinned by overlapping structures. For example, anterior cingulate 
cortex is active both during physical or social pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, Williams, 2003) 
and the physical pain reliever acetaminophen (Tylenol) was shown to additionally reduce 
social pain (DeWall et al., 2010). These findings of similarities in the neural processing of 
social and physical pain challenge Maslow’s theory (1943) of a hierarchy of needs. This 
theory predicts that individuals will prioritize the prevention of physical pain over social pain. 
However, in the light of these recent social cognitive neuroscience findings, we may revise 
how we think about these hierarchical priorities (Lieberman, 2010). For example, the priority 
to prevent physical pain and certain types of social pain may be clustered in the same 
hierarchical level, and this revised version would now predict that, when prevention of 
certain types of physical and social pain compete, individuals would not have a particular 
preference to prevent one type over the other.    
Similarly, in light of neurobiological evidence in the context of human values, we 
might revise our current notion about the structure of human values. For example, if 
particular pathways in the brain (e.g., the volume of reward-related neural regions, the 
integrity of reward-related tracts connecting these regions) are found to be strongly associated 
to a particular value (e.g., hedonism) but not associated (or associated in the opposite 
direction) to the adjacent value (e.g., stimulation) then this finding may challenge the 
hypothesized motivational congruence of these adjacent values (which formed the basis to 
place them next to each other in the circular model in the first place), or suggest a unique way 
in which this congruence is encoded in the brain (e.g., through diffuse indirect brain 
pathways).  
The ability of social cognitive neuroscience to help elucidate mechanisms and 
develop theory may have diverse benefits.  One important benefit is to help addressing social 
psychological questions that have gone unanswered for years (Lieberman, 2010). For 
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example, it is commonly known that there is individual variation in the relative importance of 
human values (e.g. hedonism) as a guiding principle in one’s life. Why do some people have 
a strong tendency to value hedonism and live hedonic lives while others appear to choose 
more restraint? Questions such as this have diverse answers, including roles for a range of 
cultural, social, personal, and biological factors.  The field of social-cognitive neuroscience 
helps to utilize the knowledge of reward-related biological pathways of the brain derived 
from years of human and animal neuroscientific research, thereby gaining insight into 
neurological mediators in such questions. Also, a number of psychiatric conditions have been 
previously linked to human-value related behaviours (Hanel & Wolradt, 2016). For example, 
people suffering from depression tend to avoid interacting with others; psychopaths tend to 
undermine and even violate social norms and manipulate others. Employing the methods of 
neuroscience to study brain abnormalities in response to human-related deficits can help 
illuminate the neural systems underlying such social deficits and the values to which they 
relate. Moreover, developing certain biomarkers can help in the assessment and/or 
intervention of such deficits.  
Taken together, the pivotal aim of the present thesis is to take advantage of the social 
cognitive neuroscience approach to bridge different levels of explanation in the context of 
human values. This is important because values act through processes that can be found in the 
brain.  Therefore, elucidating these processes and their connections to values has the potential 
to help us learn more about what values do (their functions) and how they are interrelated to 
each other and to other constructs (their structure). 
 
1.3. The evolution of human values and the “social brain” hypothesis  
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Human values are thought to help us to achieve a smooth social functioning in the complex 
societies in which we live (Schwartz, 1992). This functioning is interesting in light of 
evidence examining brain properties (e.g., size) and social characteristics in animals.  
Compared to other animals, humans live and interact with other conspecifics in considerably 
more complex social environments. There is now converging evidence of a positive 
association between relative brain size and the social complexity in which organisms live. In 
fact, the best predictor of brain to body ratio across primate species is the individuals’ social 
group size. Moreover, relative brain size correlates with many indices of social complexity, 
including social group size, number of females in the group, grooming clique size, frequency 
of coalitions, male mating strategies, frequency of social learning, frequency of tactical 
deception, and prevalence of social play (reviewed in Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). As can be 
seen in Figure 1.2., humans have the highest brain-to-body ratio and they live in the largest 
groups. Taken together, this evidence implies that the larger the brain, the greater the number 
of social relationships that can be sustained (Ward, 2012).  
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Figure 1.2. Scatter-plot exhibiting a strong positive association between neocortex size and 
social network size in primates. (Adapted from Kudo & Dunbar, 2001). 
 
Despite the general agreement on humans’ unique social complexity, and the 
relationship between this social complexity and relative brain size, there has been debate on 
the exact nature of the neural underpinning of our ability for this social complexity. Indeed, a 
perennial neuroscientific question in the context of human evolution is whether the brain has 
a specialized social module that exclusively computes social-related information (also known 
as the “social brain”), or whether our remarkable social abilities are mere applications of our 
general ability to think and reason analytically (Ward, 2012).  
The “social brain” view suggests that there are particular regions or networks in the 
brain (notably amygdala, orbital frontal cortex and temporal cortex (Brothers, 1990)) 
involved in social-related processing (or specific types of social-related processing), but not 
involved in other types of cognitive processing. A number of previous studies (cited in Ward, 
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2012) support this modular view.  For example, it has been demonstrated that there are 
certain regions in the brain that exclusively process the sight of faces (e.g. Kanwisher, 2000), 
the detection of cheating (Cosmides, 1989) or the mental state of others (Saxe, 2006). This 
latter mentalizing network (which is composed of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, 
posterior cingulate cortext, temporoparietal junction and anterior temporal cortex) has been 
studied extensively and is thought to support thinking about the thoughts, feelings, and goals 
of others (Liebermann, 2012). By contrasting it with the structure of other networks for 
analytic thought and memorization, and using a see-saw analogy, Liebermann and others 
provided evidence that there is a competition between the mentalizing and working memory 
networks in many settings.  In other words, when one network is active, the activity of the 
other decreases and vice versa (Lieberman, 2012). For example, at rest, there is a negative 
correlation between the activities of these two networks (Fox et al., 2005). Moreover, certain 
cognitive tasks that recruit the lateral frontoparietal working memory regions significantly 
decrease the concurrent neural activity of the medial frontoparietal mentalizing regions 
(McKiernan, Kaufman, Kucera-Thompson & Binder, 2003). Furthermore, higher activity in 
the mentalizing network during analytic processing leads to poorer task performance (Li, 
Yan, Bergquist & Sinha, 2007; Weissman, Robert, Visscher & Woldorff, 2006). Of note 
however these two networks are thought to operate in concert in other settings (Lieberman, 
2012). Lastly, patients with social functioning deficits (but not general intelligence deficits) 
such as autism typically show abnormal activation of the social brain network during social-
processing tasks (Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder & Tager-Flusber, 2007). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that there may be some modules in the brain that are specialized for the 
processing of social information. However, contrary to the social brain view, others disagree 
with the notion that brain contains specialized modules exclusively devoted for social-related 
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processing and argue that the so called social regions compute both social and non-social 
aspects of cognition such as reasoning (e.g., Gould, 1991).   
A related debate considers the origins of humans’ remarkable social abilities and their 
associated biological underpinnings. According to the first view, the social-intelligence 
hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976), also termed social-brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998) or the 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Whiten & Byrne, 1988), the environmental pressures 
of living in highly complex social lives in large groups triggered the unusual enlargement of 
the brain in primates causing an increase in their general intellect. Such pressures include 
meeting one’s requirements, while coordinating one’s behaviour with other group members. 
According to the opposite view (cited in Holekamp, 2007), the greater intellect and larger 
brains did not evolve because of social complexity but because of selective forces in the non-
social physical environment, including the need to learn and recall when and where food 
might become available.   
In alignment with the social-intelligence hypothesis, it is possible that the 
manifestation of human values over the course of evolution has arisen in response to social 
complexity, as a tool enabling smooth functioning within large social groups. It is also 
conceivable that different human values existed over the course of evolution.  Indeed, as 
discussed above, Schwartz circumplex model features a set of human values that are present 
across cultures supporting the evolutionary conserved idea.  Nonetheless, a set of values, the 
ones that provided the best social functioning, may have been most strongly conserved. This 
may explain why most cultures attach the highest levels of importance to values that are 
relatively important in social functioning (e.g., Bard et al., 2009), including Schwartz’s self-
transcendence values in particular.  One of the aims of the present thesis is to test the 
hypothesis that the human values recognised by all cultures may be reflected in biological 
indices, including measures of genetic factors, brain structure, and brain function.    
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1.4. Human Values and Genetics 
Knowledge of the genetic underpinnings of human values is scarce. To investigate 
whether human values has a strong genetic component previous studies (see below) utilized 
the twin study methodology. Twin studies are important because they allow researchers to 
disentangle the genetic (nature) vs the environmental (nurture) determinants of a trait or a 
behavior. A twin study is usually consisted of two types of twins. The first type is 
monozygotic or identical twins who are genetically identical to each other (i.e., they share 
100% of their genes) and they share 100% of their prenatal and family environment. The 
second type of twins is the dizygotic or fraternal twins who like identical twins share 100% of 
their environment but crucially they share 50% of their genes. The twin study methodology 
allows the researcher to isolate these genetic and environmental factors, for it allows the 
examination of the effect of genes while the environment is help constant. This is usually 
achieved by comparing, for example, the correlation coefficient of a human value score 
between monozygotic twins and the corresponding correlation coefficient of dizygotic twins. 
If the monozygotic coefficient is significantly higher than the dizygotic then it would support 
that human values have a strong genetic component.  
Despite the ability to isolate the genetic from environmental factors, twin studies are 
unable to provide information on the specific genetic locations that account for differences at 
the phenotypic level. To this end, a number of techniques, such as linkage analysis and 
candidate gene association studies have been used for several decades. These techniques are 
particularly powerful in the identification a specific genetic variant of traits or diseases that 
are genetically determined by a very small number of genetic factors. However, when the 
trait or the disease does not fulfill this criterion (i.e., are influenced by a large number of 
common low penetrant variants) such approaches are insensitive to identify a genetic 
association explaining the phenotype. Indeed, complex traits such as human values, are 
15 
 
known to have many environmental and genetic contributions many of which have subtle 
individual effects. Therefore variations at the phenotypic level of such traits are unlikely to be 
explained by a small number of genes.  
 However, recent technological advances made it possible to investigate the subtle 
genetic contributions (i.e., many genetic variants) that are collectively associated to a 
complex trait. This can be achieved with a Genome Wide Association Study (GWAS) which 
is an unbiased examination (in that it does not require the selection of a specific candidate 
gene in advance) of a genome-wide of genetic variants in different individuals to examine 
whether any genetic variant is associated with the trait or disease under investigation. Since 
human values are particularly complex traits and thus influenced by a large number of 
interacting genetic and environmental factors, the most suitable genetic methodology for 
investigating the genetic components of human values is GWAS. However, no GWAS study 
was ever conducted on human values.  
 
1.5. Human Values and Brain Anatomy 
Our knowledge regarding the brain correlates of human values derives from a variety 
of sources, including functional and structural brain imaging studies of associations with 
values and value-related traits (Kanai & Rees, 2011) and neuropsychological studies of 
patients displaying specific moral deficits (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). These studies illustrated 
the roles of cortical, mainly frontal regions, as well as subcortical cortices as the neural 
machinery in processing human values and morally-relevant behaviours. With regard to 
values, Zahn et al. (2009) demonstrated that values’ abstract (i.e. context-independent) 
meaning is represented in the right superior anterior temporal lobe, whilst the motivational 
properties of values are represented in frontal and subcortical areas. In addition, reading 
examples of actions reflecting human values (e.g., correcting injustice) and reflecting on the 
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importance of these values has been shown to recruit the medial prefrontal cortex (Brosch, 
Coppin, Schwartz & Sander, 2012).  
In the context of motivational properties of value-related behaviour, Moll et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that affiliative emotion (induced by kinship-related social scenarios) is 
associated with activation of basal forebrain structures, especially the septo-hypothalamic 
area. Moreover, in an examination of one type of value-related behaviour, prosociality, Moll 
et al. (2006) showed that the subgenual cingulate cortex and septal region were selectively 
activated for donations vs selfish rewards, and the same regions tracked individual 
differences in beliefs about family entitativity which are similar to family-related values, such 
as family security (Rusch et al., 2014). In other studies, pictures or narratives of moral 
violations activated the orbitofrontal gyrus and the medial prefrontal cortex (Moll et al., 
2002; Berthoz, Armony, Blair & Dolan, 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004), and the medial PFC 
and OFC were involved when participants engaged in costly and non-costly monetary 
decisions to oppose societal causes (Moll et al., 2006). Ventromedial PFC and OFC were also 
involved in a condition facilitating mutual cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rilling et 
al., 2002), and patients with medial frontal and orbitofrontal deficits demonstrate 
abnormalities in morally relevant behaviours (Ward, 2012).  
Studies of brain anatomy have also explored psychological variables related to human 
values, but distinct from them. These variables include political attitudes, personality traits, 
and moral beliefs. With regard to political attitudes, Kanai, Feilden, Firth and Rees (2011) 
found that greater liberalism was associated with increased grey matter volume in the anterior 
cingulate cortex and that greater conservatism was associated with increased volume of the 
right amygdala. However, the links between these political ideologies and values is unclear, 
because ideologies are related to multiple values (e.g., liberalism to the value dimensions of 
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self-transcendence, self-enhancement) in ways that vary across nations and not to any 
particular values distinctly (e.g., Ashton et al., 2005; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).  
With regard to personality traits, Gardini, Clininger and Venneri (2009) investigated 
the association between grey matter volume and personality scores using the Three-
dimensional Personality Questionnaire. Higher novelty seeking, an inclination similar to 
Schwartz’s stimulation values, was associated with more grey matter volume in the right 
frontal and posterior cingulate regions. Higher reward dependence, similar to Schwartz’s 
hedonism value, was correlated with less grey matter volume in the caudate nucleus and in 
the rectal gyrus, a part of the frontal lobe. Persistence, a tendency conceptually related to 
Schwartz’s achievement value, showed a positive correlation with grey matter volume in the 
precuneus, paracentral lobule and parahippocampal gyrus. Thus, traits that are associated 
with some of the values in Schwartz’s model, including the portion covering self-
enhancement and openness values in particular, were empirically linked to brain morphology 
in this study. 
Links between moral beliefs and brain structure have been also been investigated. In a 
voxel-based morphometry (VBM) study of the relationship between grey matter volume and 
scores on the Moral Foundation Questionnaire (Lewis, Kanai, Bates & Rees, 2012), the 
authors found that moral individualizing (conceptually similar to Schwartz’s self-
enhancement) was positively associated with grey matter volume in the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex and negatively with grey matter volume in the bilateral precuneus. 
Conversely, moral binding (conceptually similar to Schwartz’s conservation value 
dimensions, see Boer & Fischer (2013)) was positively associated with grey matter volume in 
the bilateral subcallosal gyrus of the frontal lobe. Overall, then, previous studies have found 
some structural brain correlates of psychological variables that are relevant to values, but no 
previous study tested the sinusoidal hypothesis (Figure 1B) using neuroanatomical data.  
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1.6. Human values and brain functions 
 An important attribute of the animal brain is its ability to derive indices of reward and 
punishment from different objects and behaviour.  These indices help us to make choices in 
complex environments.  For humans, these complex environments are very social in nature, 
bringing social values into play.  Thus, an interesting question is how social values relate to 
reward processing in the brain. 
 
1.6.1. The motivational nature of human values and the reward circuitry in the brain  
One of the most central properties of human values is their motivational nature. The 
motivational nature of human values as well as the impact on the reward-circuitry of the brain 
raises the possibility that they might be underpinned by certain subcortical brain regions that 
are particularly involved in motivated behavior and reward processing, a hypothesis that has 
never been directly tested at the level of brain anatomy. The putative reward system of the 
human brain is centered on hubs in the basal ganglia (striatum and Globus Pallidus) and 
includes the ventral tegmental area (VTA), prefrontal brain regions, and parts of the limbic 
system (Haber and Knutson 2010). Studying the association between hedonism-related values 
and the structural properties of the reward system, which is a classical circuitry of the brain, 
would substantiate the evolutionary account of human values, and is an objective of some of 
the research reported in this thesis.  
 
1.6.2. Human values and reward-related processing in a foraging context  
Apart from merely looking at the neuroanatomy, the relationship between human 
values and reward-related processing can also be investigated at the level of behavior and 
brain function. Two types of economic decision-making paradigms are particularly relevant 
to this possibility, both of which are reward-related tasks: classical economic decision 
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making and foraging. Classical economic decision making mainly involves a binary choice 
between two currently available options. Previous neuroimaging classical economic decision 
making work in the context of charitable donations (Brosch, Coppin, Scherer, Schwartz & 
Sander, 2011) showed that human values motivate behaviour through their impact on the 
reward-circuitry of the brain.    
Foraging, on the other hand which has been recently investigated with neuroimaging 
methods (see below), involves a binary choice between staying with the currently available 
option or leaving it to search for alternative ones. Many life decisions can be conceptualized 
as foraging problems (Charnov 1976; Constantino & Daw, 2015).  Employment decisions, 
mate selection, and internet searches are just a few examples of scenarios wherein people 
must choose whether to engage with the currently available options or to search for 
alternative ones. To solve this type of problem, an ideal forager compares the value of two 
strategies -- engaging with the currently available option or foregoing it to search for 
alternatives -- and chooses the one of highest value. This is the optimal solution described in 
the Marginal Value Theorem (Charnov 1976) which requires comparing the value of the 
current option to the overall value of the alternative, foraging environment. Previous 
neuroimaging foraging studies found that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is positively 
associated with the overall value of foraging (Kolling, Behrens, Mars & Rushworth, 2012). 
However, this psychological function of the ACC was subsequently challenged by research 
showing that, when choice difficulty is properly controlled, ACC activity is no longer 
associated with the overall value of foraging. However, there is still an active debate on the 
issue (Kolling, Behrens, Wittmann & Rushworth, 2016; Shenhav, Straccia, Botvinick & 
Cohen, 2016). 
Classical economic decision making (Brosch et al., 2011), as opposed to foraging, has 
been previously studied in the context of human values. Brosch and colleagues showed that 
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human values were involved in classical economic decision making via the reward-system of 
the brain. However, it is currently unknown whether human values are also involved in 
foraging behaviour, which is considerably more complex than classical decision making 
(Shenhav, Straccia, Cohen & Botvinick, 2014), and whether they recruit brain systems other 
than the reward-circuitry of the brain. The aim of the last experimental section of the thesis is 
to investigate these questions.   
 
1.7. Structure of the thesis  
Taken together, it is currently feasible to provide evidence testing a neurological 
contribution to human values if one carefully utilizes the reliable neuroscience markers, such 
as polygenic scores, brain anatomy and reward-related decisions. This thesis investigates the 
neurobiology of human values in three areas/sections: genetics, neuroanatomy, and reward-
related decisions. The neuroanatomy section consists of two studies. In the first neuroimaging 
study, I examined non-linear associations between values and brain structure.  In 85 
participants, I found the predicted sinusoidal relationship between ratings of values and two 
measures of white matter, volume and myelin volume fraction, as well as for grey matter 
parameters in several frontal regions. These effects reveal new functional associations for 
structural brain parameters and provide a novel cross-validation of Schwartz’s model. 
Moreover, the sinusoidal waveform test can be applied to other circumplex models in social, 
affective and cognitive neuroscience.  
The general research question in the second study was whether the motivational 
nature of human values is underpinned by brain structures that are particularly involved in 
motivated behaviour and reward processing. I hypothesized that variation in subcortical hubs 
of the reward system and their main connecting pathway, the medial forebrain bundle (MFB) 
is associated with individual value orientation. This was the first study to illuminate the 
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associations between the importance people attach to the human value of hedonism and 
structural variation in reward-related subcortical brain regions.  
The second main section of this thesis deals with the genetic underpinnings of human 
values. Indeed, human values and personality have been shown to share genetic variance in 
twin studies. However, there is a lack of evidence about the genetic components of this 
association. This study examined the interplay between genes, values, and personality in the 
case of neuroticism, because polygenic scores were available for this personality trait (but not 
for others). As described later in the thesis, the results pave the way for an investigation of 
the biological mechanisms contributing to human value orientations. 
The third, and last, experimental section aims at investigating how human values 
affect economic decision making (foraging and classical) and its neural underpinnings in the 
context of charitable donations. I found that self-focused individuals, compared to the social- 
focused ones, kept more money for themselves than for a charity. There was a negative 
relationship between the self-focus score and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during 
the personal compared to social foraging but not during the classical economic decision 
making. This finding complements those of the previous sections.   
Together, all of the findings support the main hypothesis of the thesis. The results 
consistently support the assumption that human values are associated with a number of 
markers across multiple levels of neurobiology.  The General Discussion elaborates on the 
ramifications of these findings, limitations of the current evidence, and future research 
directions. 
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Chapter 2: Human Values and Genetics:  
The Genetics of Neuroticism and Human Values 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 The prior work investigating the genetic component of human values is currently 
very limited. A recent extended twin family (also known as nuclear twin family study) study 
(Kandler et al., 2016), which included data from twins and their parents, allowed researchers 
to disentangle genetic from environmental transmission between parents and their offspring. 
In particular, they investigated whether the parent-child similarity in human values is 
primarily determined by the environmental or the genetic transmission of human values. The 
results indicated that human value parent-child similarity was primarily due to their shared 
genetic makeup instead of environmental parent-child transmission. Another twin study 
(Knafo & Plomin, 2006) investigated the genetic and environmental influences explaining the 
stability and change of prosocial behavior in children from early to middle childhood. Using 
longitudinal genetic analyses, the authors found that genetic influences explain both change 
and continuity in prosocial behavior while nonshared environment contributes mainly to 
change. 
Another set of previous studies on this topic have focused on the genetic components 
of relations between human values and personality traits (Schermer, Feather, Zhu & Martin, 
2008; Shermer et al., 2011). The reason for this is twofold: (1) there is a growing body of 
knowledge of the genetic basis of personality (but not of human values) and (2) human values 
are reliably associated with certain personality traits at the behavioral level (Parks-Leduc et 
al., 2015; Rim 1984). Extending this connection, studies of twins have found that the shared 
variance between human values utilized Schwartz's (1992) circular model of values and 
personality has a significant heritable component (Schermer et al., 2008, 2011).  
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However, the exact genetic loci driving this association between values from 
Schwartz's model and personality have remained obscure. This association can be 
investigated by utilizing a growing body of knowledge on personality genetics. As complex 
psychological dispositions, human values and personality traits are both likely to be affected 
by numerous genes simultaneously (in addition to strong environmental influences). To 
capture the genetic influence of complex traits and values, it is therefore useful to focus on 
genetic indices that reflect the contribution of a great number of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), such as polygenic scores derived from Genome-Wide Association 
Studies (GWAS).  
A polygenic neuroticism score (PNS) has been available through a recent meta-
analysis of GWAS of personality traits (N = 63 661) (Genetics of Personality Consortium et 
al., 2015). Neuroticism is a personality factor ranging from emotional stability to high 
nervousness, tension and moodiness. In the meta-analysis, a neuroticism score (NS) was 
derived from a number of measures including the NEO Personality Inventory, the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire, the International Personality Item Pool inventory, harm avoidance 
scores in Cloninger's Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire and negative emotionality 
scores in the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. The meta-analysis showed that 
0.6% of the variance in this NS was explained by the PNS. Although this low percentage 
suggests only a small genetic component, it was reliable and potentially important, making it 
a relevant candidate for studying genetic contributions to neuroticism and other individual 
differences related to neuroticism. The shared genetic associations between personality traits 
and human values and the recent identification of the polygenic neuroticism score provide a 
foundation for expecting that the polygenic association with neuroticism may also relate to 
value orientations. Human values are particularly interesting in connection to neuroticism.  A 
recent meta-analysis of the relations between human values and the Big Five traits found 
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reliable trait-value associations, except when looking at neuroticism (Parks-Leduc et al, 
2015). The authors explained this non-association using Cloninger’s (1994) proposition that 
neuroticism is more appropriately described as a temperament (i.e., an automatic associative 
response to emotional stimuli) than as a character trait (i.e., a self-aware volitional concept 
related to behavioural intentions). This indicates a stronger biological component to 
neuroticism than to other traits, which, like human values, may be amenable to higher levels 
of cognitive processing and control.  Thus, from this perspective, neuroticism may manifest a 
genetic component, but little association with human values.  
However, a different possibility emerges if we consider relevant research examining 
links between neuroticism and relevant affective states and attitudes.  Neuroticism is 
associated with a higher likelihood of anxiety and depression, which are two hallmarks of 
emotional instability that lead people to withdraw from the world around them (Angst, 
Gamma, & Endrass, 2003; Thompson, Berenbaum, & Bredemeier, 2011). This pattern 
suggests that emotionally instability may cause people to be less open to new experiences, 
ideas, and feelings, because of potential threats to their fragile emotional state. Convergent 
with these observations, lower levels of neuroticism are associated with more liberal, curious, 
and open-minded attitudes (e.g., Carney, Jost, Gosling & Potter, 2008; van Hiel & Mervielde, 
2004). Strong links between such attitudes and Schwartz’s openness value type (Ashton et al., 
2005) suggests that an inverse relation between openness values (see Figure 1A) and 
neuroticism is viable.  
The present research was therefore motivated by the shared genetic variance between 
human values and personality, the existence of a polygenic score for neuroticism, and the 
ambiguity about neuroticism-value relations.  I sought to test whether the potential genetic 
contribution to neuroticism has similar patterns of the association with human values and the 
trait on a phenotypic level.  To be clear, the prediction was not that values mediate the link 
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between genes and traits or that traits mediate the link between genes and values.  In theory, 
values and traits should reciprocally influence each other, as stable individual differences 
over time, leading to an association that is bidirectional.  Our principal aim was to test 
whether associations with genes emerged for both the trait and values. Moreover, we wished 
to detect whether any observed associations arose in a sinusoidal pattern congruent with 
Schwartz’s circumplex model of values. This is because one of the core aims of the present 
thesis is to test whether the motivational relations within the value system itself (i.e., the 
relationship between the 10 human values) is reflected in these neurobiological markers 
including genetic data. The chief interest was whether the motivational conflicts described in 
Schwartz’s model have neurological components.  That is, I did not focus on specific values, 
but utilized a test of the roles of value types organized along the two motivational dimensions 
described by Schwartz.  This focus enabled me to rely upon the motivational aspects of 
values predicted by the model – aspects which are distinct from the abstract meaning of 
specific values per se (Schwartz & Bilsky 1987).  
 
2.2. Material and Methods 
 
Participants and Procedure 
The studies described in this and the next chapter (neurostructural) were performed on 
the same cohort of participants. Eighty one right-handed Caucasian university students 
between 19 and 42 (50 females; mean age=23.85 ± 3.71 SD) participated in the study, which 
was approved by the Ethics Committee in the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. 
Participants were informed that the study examined the connection between value-morality 
judgments and biological indices. They took part individually in the laboratory, wherein they 
completed the measures of human values and personality, provided a saliva sample, and were 
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then debriefed. The sample used consisted of an existing sample collected for behavioural 
analysis. The present study included all the participants from the existing sample for which 
the human value score, personality score and the genetic score was available. 
 
Human Values 
Participants completed the 56-item Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). 
Participants rated the importance of each of the 56 values is as a guiding principle in their 
lives, using a quasi-bipolar 9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not 
important), 4 (important), to 7 (of supreme importance). Examples of SVS items are as 
follows: “Equality: Equal opportunity for all” (Universalism); “Pleasure: Gratification of 
desires” (Hedonism); “Obedient: Dutiful meeting obligations” (Conformity). The average 
score across the 56 items was then calculated and subtracted from each of the 56 initial raw 
scores. Schwartz recommends this procedure to help control for superfluous individual 
variations in rating styles (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). The individual centred item scores were then 
averaged to form scores for each type of value examined in Schwartz’s model (see Figure 
1A).  The internal consistency of these indices was moderate to good (Supplementary 
Material 2.1). 
 
Personality Measure  
We quantified NS using the 100-item self-report version of the HEXACO Personality 
Inventory-Revised (HEXACO-PI-R) (Lee & Ashton, 2004). In the HEXACO-PI-R, NS is 
termed emotionality, and it features subscales for fearfulness, anxiety, dependence, and 
sentimentality. These subscales are combined together as the total emotionality score (α = 
.64).  Furthermore, many influential research programs have interpreted and labelled 
Neuroticism from the Big Five as Emotional Stability (e.g., De Raad et al., 2010; Goldberg, 
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1990; Saucier, 1994).  It was previously shown that HEXACO Emotionality represents an 
alternative rotation of Big Five Neuroticism (Ashton, Lee & de Vries, 2014) and that they are 
similar constructs (Ashton et al., 2014; Romero, Villar & López-Romero, 2015).  
Furthermore, the emotionality score provides a particularly interesting and important 
rendition of neuroticism in this context because of its relative emphasis on emotional 
instability, which leads people to withdraw from the world around them (Angst et al., 2003; 
Thompson et al., 2011), and HEXACO’s emotionality dimension is well-suited to detecting 
the links with values (Pozzebon & Ashton, 2009).   
 
DNA Extraction and Genotyping 
Genomic DNA was obtained from saliva using Oragene OG-500 saliva kits. 
Genotyping was performed using custom genotyping arrays (Illumina HumanCoreExome-24 
BeadChip), which contain 570,038 genetic variants (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, CA). Quality 
control was implemented in PLINK (Purcell et al., 2007) to ensure that the genotypes did not 
display ambiguous sex, cryptic relatedness (up to third degree relatives by identity of 
descent), genotyping completeness < 97%, and non-European ethnicity admixture (detected 
as outliers in iterative EIGENSTRAT analyses of an LD-pruned dataset; Price et al., 2006). 
SNPs were excluded where the minor allele frequency was < 1%, if the call rate <98%, or if 
the χ2-test for Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium had a p-value < 1 e-04.  Individuals’ genotypes 
were imputed using the pre-phasing/imputation stepwise approach implemented in 
IMPUTE2/SHAPEIT (Delaneau et al., 2012, Howie et al., 2009) and 1000Genomes 
(December 2013, release 1000 Genomes haplotypes Phase I integrated variant set) as the 
reference dataset.  
Generation of Risk Profile Scores 
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PNS was calculated using the method described by the International Schizophrenia 
Consortium (International Schizophrenia et al., 2009). PNS was estimated using publicly 
available data from the international GWAS (Genetics of Personality et al., 2015).  SNPs 
were subsequently pruned for linkage disequilibrium (r2<0.2). This method ensured that all 
SNPs included in the PNS model were fairly independent. PNS scores were calculated using 
the ‘score’ command in PLINK, which averages the number of risk alleles for each index 
SNP, weighted by the natural logarithm of the SNP’s odds ratio extracted from the GWAS 
results (Genetics of Personality et al., 2015). From the 6949612 SNPs, a total of 206516 
quasi-independent SNPs were considered in the PNS (p < .5). PNS was calculated at the 
liberal p-threshold (p<. 5), because it best predicted NS in the GWAS reference data 
(Genetics of Personality et al., 2015). There were no outliers in the PNS scores, and the 
scores were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk: p >.3). 
 
 
Sinusoidal Relationship Analysis 
To test the sinusoidal pattern, I employed a new methodology (Hanel, Zacharopoulos, 
Megardon & Maio, 2016) and an established one (Boer & Fischer, 2013, Supplementary 
Material 2.3.). The text in this chapter focuses on the new, more conservative approach, but 
parallel findings for the other test are described in Supplementary Material 2.3. Similar to 
previous approaches the aim of our methodology is simply to test the sinusoidal prediction of 
Schwartz circumplex model. Before describing the model in great detail, it would be 
appropriate to introduce the two-fold value of this new methodology to the non-specialist. 
First, compared to previous approaches, this new methodology is an unbiased, agnostic 
approach in that it does not require the researcher to specify in advance how the 10 human 
value types should be associated to the external variable. Rather, it empirically calculate 
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whether an external variable has a sinusoidal relationship to the human value types. Second, 
substantiated by various simulations (see below), this approach is considerably conservative 
in that it minimizes the chance of committing a type 1 error.  
To test the sinusoidal pattern for an external variable, the correlation coefficients with 
the 10 value types were calculated. The fit of the sinusoidal function presented below (1) was 
calculated using the programming language R  
 
(1)        ŷ = f(x) = a + b*sin(c*x + d) 
 
where ŷ are the estimated numerical values (e.g., estimated correlation coefficients), x 
is a vector containing the numbers 1 to 10, the parameter a is the y-offset that moves the 
function up and down along the ordinate (y-axis), the parameter b determines amplitude of 
the sinus wave on the y-axis, the parameter c is the period of the sine wave and finally the 
parameter d (x-offset) moves the sinusoidal function along the x-axis.  
The script that was written to calculate the sinusoidal fit index is composed of build-in 
mathematical functions available in R. Here I provide a description of the main functions 
used in the Sinusoidal Fit Index. To optimize the four parameters (a, b, c, d) of the sine 
function  (equation 1), the ‘brute force method’ was used.  This method is an exploration 
approach utilised to determine the starting points for the actual optimization function, using 
the R command optim (general-purpose optimization function, https://stat.ethz.ch/R-
manual/R-devel/library/stats/html/optim.html). This is because the R command optim that is 
often used for optimizations, only searches for local minima (i.e., stabilizes to the closest 
local minima) – as do all optimization algorithms. The optim function takes 4 arguments-
inputs (the a, b, c, and d of the eq1 and produces 4 outputs through Nelder–Mead, quasi-
Newton and conjugate-gradient algorithms (Nelder & Mead, 1965; Nash, 1990). For all the 
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parameters a, b, c, and d 50 numerical values were selected, resulting in 50x50x50x50 = 
6,250,000 combinations. Specifically, I tested which of 6,250,000 combinations of the 
parameters a, b, c, and d of the sinusoidal function results in a sine function that has the 
smallest deviation to the empirical data. The selection of numerical values (i.e., the 6,250,000 
combinations) was done to achieve both a range that is as large as necessary – more 
combinations can increase the fit slightly – but still manageable in computational terms.   
For each parameter, the numerical values were selected from a specific range 
according to the theoretical predictions of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz et al. (2012).  The 
50 numerical values selected for the parameter a were -1, -.96, -.92, …, .96, 1.  In other 
words the values of parameter a were restricted from -1 to 1 because this is the range within 
which a correlation coefficient can range. For the same reason, the same restrictions were 
applied to parameter b, which determines amplitude of the sinus wave on the y-axis (i.e., the 
distance between the turning points of the sinusoidal function). The parameter c, the period of 
the sine wave, was restricted to range from 85-95% of a full sine wave. This restriction was 
based on the circular model’s assumption that “the distances between the values around the 
circle may not be equal” (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 669).  Given that the first value type was 
plotted at x = 1, the parameter d (x-offset), which moves the sinusoidal function along the x-
axis, was set to the interval [1 + 10/2, 1 – 10/2].  The parameter d was restricted by 10 which 
is the number of correlation coefficients between the external variable and the 10 value types. 
This is because there was no hypothesis regarding the exact starting point of the sine wave for 
each brain parameter. To be able to define a lower and upper bound given these constraints, a 
method developed by Byrd, Lu, Nocedal, and Zhu (1995) was used. 
We calculated the sum of the squared residuals divided by the variance to estimate the 
model fit indices for the sinusoidal function. This fit is called, for the sinusoidal function, 
“Sinusoidal Fit Index” (SFI) (Hanel et al., 2016) and is presented below (2).  
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(2) 𝑆𝐹𝐼 =
1
𝐾−1
 ∑ (𝑦𝑘− ?̂?𝑘)
2𝐾
𝑘=1
1
𝐾−1
∑ (𝑦𝑘− ?̅?𝑘)2
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
In this equation (2), K represents the number of correlation coefficients, yk represents the 
correlation coefficients, ŷk represents the estimated correlation coefficient through the 
optimization function, and ȳk represents the mean of the correlation coefficients. The 
denominator is the formula for the variance. 
To obtain the number of false-positive results for the SFI, three simulations of m = 
100,000 samples each were conducted with the programming language R. To simulate a 
random pattern of correlation coefficients, different assumptions of the distribution of the 
correlation coefficients were tested. (1) I sampled 10 numbers (i.e., number of human values) 
between -.5 and .5, with k being the number of correlation coefficients, assuming a uniform 
distribution. The numbers -.5 to .5 represent the interval in which most correlation 
coefficients of values with external variables usually fall. (2) I sampled k numbers from a 
normal distribution with ~N(0, .1), and (3) ~N(0, .3). Numbers >|1| were restricted to -1 or 1, 
respectively.  
The proportion of false positives was well below 1% for all three different simulations 
for SFI < .20. The percentage of false positives was slightly larger if a uniform distribution 
was assumed. The percentage of false positives for an SFI < .20 was 0.49 (i.e., less than 5 
false positive results per one thousand comparisons) assuming normal distribution. This 
means that 200 SFI tests will yield merely one false positive result. Therefore, our statistical 
threshold is considerably more conservative than typical statistical thresholds (i.e., p<.05). 
The percentage of false positives were 0.20%, 0.05% and 0.005% for SFI <.15, SFI <.10 and 
SFI < .05, respectively. Please note that the main reason for our cut-off values (SFI < .20 etc.) 
were not the results of the simulations, but the careful examination of many plots. An SFI of 
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< .20 can still be considered as following a sine wave, but it is harder to recognize an SFI 
of .30 as following a sine wave.  
2.3. Results 
Replicating the Link Between PNS and NS 
Our first aim was to provide further evidence on the association between emotionality 
(NS from HEXACO-PI-R) and PNS. As expected, there was a positive association between 
these variables, r(79)=.22, p=.048 (Figure 2.1.), replicating the findings of the personality 
GWAS (2015).   
 
Figure 2.1. Scatter-plot depicting the positive association between NS and PNS, r(79)=.22, 
p=.048. Each dot represents a participant.  
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Structure of Values 
Before testing for a sinusoidal waveform in the pattern of associations between values 
and NS, and PNS, I validated Schwartz’s hypothesised circular structure in our sample.  This 
test used two Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) as recommended by Schwartz (e.g., Bilsky, 
Janik & Schwartz, 2011). The first analysis plotted the 56 value items, and the second 
analysis plotted the 10 higher-order values.  Both analyses use the respective correlation 
matrix to plot the values in a two dimensional space. The first analysis yielded S-stress =.167 
and Stress I= .274, while the second analysis yielded S-Stress=.032 and a Stress-I=.115. The 
stress value is an index of how well the data fit the hypothesized configuration; higher stress 
values signify a poorer configuration. 
Fitting the Sinusoidal Model to the NS and PNS   
Given the replication of Schwartz’s circular structure in the MDS analyses, the 
analysis turned to testing whether there are sinusoidal patterns of association between values 
and NS and PNS.  To address this question, I plotted the correlation coefficients between NS 
and PNS on the y-axis and each of the 10 lower-order values on the x-axis in an order that 
follows their circular structure. The patterns are shown in 2.2.  A pattern of sinusoidal 
association was found between human values and PNS, particularly near the inflection points 
(Figure 2.2.A), which was significant, SFI=.19; false positives=0.6%. Similarly, our analysis 
of NS reveal a sinusoidal association of a similar form (Figure 2.2.B) but the fit to the sine 
wave was not reliable, SFI = .29; p>.05.  Visual inspection of Figure 2.2.A shows that the 
correlation between NS and the human value Benevolence (BE) deviated from the sine-wave; 
running the sinusoidal test while excluding BE yields a significant SFI=.08 (Supplementary 
Material 2.2.). Overall, NS and PNS map onto the human value space in similar, sinusoidal 
waveforms. Furthermore, in addition to testing the patterns of correlations using the SFI 
method, this study replicated the PNS and NS findings using two previously established 
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methods, with even more robust results (Roccas, Sagiv, Schartz & Knafo, 2002; Boer & 
Fischer, 2013) (Supplementary Material 2.3.). 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Figure 2.2. Correlation coefficients between the 10 value types (x-axis, Conformity, 
Tradition, Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, 
Power, Security) and PNS (Panel A) and NS (Panel B). 
Discussion 
The present research investigated the genetic components connected to the relations 
between human values and an important dimension of personality, neuroticism. The present 
study used empirically robust measures of human values, neuroticism, and genetic 
neuroticism.  The results replicated the association between NS and PNS despite using a 
different measure of neuroticism than in prior research (i.e., emotionality from HEXACO-PI-
R). This result adds to the evidence that the polygenic neuroticism score derived by GWAS 
helps to explain individual variation in neuroticism (Genetics of Personality et al., 2015).  
Moreover, it laid the foundation for testing whether human values are linked to both NS and 
PNS.  Results indicated that human values were indeed associated with NS and PNS, 
following the sinusoidal pattern predicted by Schwartz and colleagues (2012) cross-cultural 
model. 
These findings fundamentally extend understanding of human values. Previous twin 
studies (Schermet et al., 2011; Schermer et al., 2008; Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, & 
Tellegen, 1990; Keller, Arvey, Dawis, Bouchard & Segal, 1992) have documented that 
human values may have a genetic component, but this has occurred without simultaneously 
pinpointing relevant patterns of genes, the pattern of associations with the values, and the 
nature of the common association to the behavioural phenotype for personality. Here, we 
document a novel sinusoidal relationship between human values and a specific genetic 
marker, the PNS – a relationship that was very similar to that found between NS and values.  
Furthermore, as expected, Figure 2.2 shows that the sinusoidal waveforms were 
anchored at one end by negative relations between values promoting stimulation or self-
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direction and NS or PNS at the other end.  This pattern fits links between neuroticism and 
anxiety and depression.  As noted earlier, anxiety and depression lead people to withdraw 
from the world around them (Angst et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2011).  In addition, higher 
levels of neuroticism are associated with less liberal, curious, and open-minded attitudes 
(e.g., Carney et al., 2008; van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004).  Neuroticism may contribute to lower 
openness to new experiences, ideas, and feelings because of the threats posed by novelty. At 
the same time, the pattern of withdrawal elicited by lower stimulation and self-direction 
values may contribute to emotional instability by increasing rumination, perseveration in an 
isolated environment, and self-absorption.  Further evidence is needed to explore these 
possibilities.   
The authors acknowledge that the strong sinusoidal association between human values 
and neuroticism found here is not inconsistent with the meta-analytic finding showing the 
absence of a sinusoidal association (Parks-Leduc et al, 2015). A number of factors may 
explain this discrepancy. The measures of neuroticism used in the meta-analytic study 
(Neuroticism from Five-Factor Model, FFM) and here (Emotionality from HEXACO) are 
similar but not identical with correlation coefficients around r=.55 (Ashton et al., 2014; 
Romero, Villar & López-Romero, 2015). This raises the possibility that the unique variance 
of HEXACO’s emotionality (rather than the shared variance with FFM’s Neuroticism) may 
be related to human values and thus explain the discrepancy. Future studies administering 
both personality measures and human values can interrogate this possibility.  
Two other aspects of our results merit further discussion.  First, it is informative to 
contrast the sinusoidal pattern, which is a test of association across all values, with the 
strength of the correlations with specific values.  This is interesting in part because most of 
the correlations between specific values and PNS or NS were weak and unreliable, aside from 
the significant theoretically congruent correlations discussed above (see Supplementary 
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Material 2.4).  Nonetheless, the sinusoidal fit reveals a crucial pattern that is missing from 
univariate tests that focus on one value at a time.  It is possible for individual relations to be 
weak at the same time as their combined pattern is meaningful and reliable.  In analyses of 
values, this difference between individual correlations and the net pattern is crucial, because 
the relative roles of different values are more psychologically important and meaningful than 
the roles of any single value type in isolation, due to competing implications between values 
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). 
Second, the NS variance explained from the PNS was much higher in the present 
study (4%) than in the initial discovery sample (0.6%). A number of factors may account for 
the larger relation in this study. First, the present study measured neuroticism using a single 
scale in a single homogeneous cohort, whereas the meta-analytic study assessed neuroticism 
from multiple instruments (even in the same cohort). Second, the present study used a single 
measure of neuroticism with subscales (Fearfulness, Anxiety, Dependence, and 
Sentimentality) that are different and more emotional in focus than in the replication cohort in 
the meta-analytic study (NEO-FFI’s Neuroticism: anxiety, hostility, depression, self-
consciousness, impulsiveness, vulnerability to stress and Amsterdam Biographical 
Questionnaire). Third, the power of the current study merely allows the detection of a 
moderate effect, and future replication studies may yield a smaller effect; therefore, future 
research should interpret the current effect size with caution. Despite these possibilities, the 
current replication of the NS-PNS relation is promising for future research attempting to learn 
more about this relation and its implications. 
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Chapter 3: Human Values and Neuroanatomy 
3.1. Non-linear association between human values and Neuroanatomy   
3.1.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I tested and accepted the sinusoidal hypothesis by using 
genetic data. The current sub-section of this experimental chapter directly tested the 
sinusoidal hypothesis using brain structural correlates. Whether Schwartz’s putative 
evolutionarily (see General Introduction) conserved set of values and their latent conflicts 
might be reflected in brain anatomy has hitherto not been explored.  
As discussed in the general introduction, previous studies have found some structural 
brain correlates of psychological variables that are relevant to values. In the context of 
political attitudes, Kanai et al. (2011) showed a positive association between liberalism and 
grey matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex and a positive association between 
conservatism and the volume of the right amygdala. Gardini et al. (2009) explored the link 
between grey matter volume and personality scores using the Three-dimensional Personality 
Questionnaire. They found grey matter volume in the right frontal and posterior cingulate 
regions to be associated with higher novelty seeking, an inclination similar to Schwartz’s 
stimulation values. Moreover, they demonstrated less grey matter volume in the caudate 
nucleus and in the rectal gyrus, a part of the frontal lobe, to be correlated to higher reward 
dependence, similar to Schwartz’s hedonism value. Persistence, a tendency conceptually 
related to Schwartz’s achievement value, showed a positive correlation with grey matter 
volume in the precuneus, paracentral lobule and parahippocampal gyrus. Lewis et al. (2012) 
conducted a voxel-based morphometry (VBM) study of the relationship between grey matter 
volume and scores on the Moral Foundation Questionnaire, and found that moral 
individualizing (conceptually similar to Schwartz’s self-enhancement) was positively 
associated with grey matter volume in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and negatively with 
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grey matter volume in the bilateral precuneus. Conversely, moral binding (conceptually 
similar to Schwartz’s conservation value dimensions, see Boer and Fischer (2013)) was 
positively associated with grey matter volume in the bilateral subcallosal gyrus of the frontal 
lobe. Finally, a number of clinical studies also demonstrate an association between brain 
anatomy, primarily in frontal lobes, and value-related behaviours. For example, patients with 
ventromedial prefrontal damage (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007) exhibited irrational economic 
decision-making behaviour when playing the ultimatum game, in that they exhibited a greater 
rejection rate compared to controls in response to each of the most unfair offers. In addition, 
patients with medial frontal and orbitofrontal deficits demonstrate abnormalities in morally 
relevant behaviours (Ward, 2012). Despite the fact that prior findings suggest that value-
relevant judgements are supported by a number of brain regions, with particular relevance to 
the frontal regions where the motivational functioning of values is concerned, the past 
research was not designed to examine structural correlates of values directly. Schwartz’s 
model offers an opportunity to close this gap through its description of motivational 
dimensions in values.   
The present study directly examined brain structural correlates of the Schwartz value 
system for the first time. To test the model’s applicability in this context robustly, this 
research specifically applied a sinusoidal waveform test appropriate to the model’s 
predictions regarding motivational conflicts and compatibility between values, based on the 
full set of value types. The sinusoidal pattern of relations is more specific to this motivational 
pattern than the mere detection of linear associations without any theoretical foundation, 
which is beset by multiple testing problems.  To enhance the power of the study, the analyses 
initially focused on testing for the sinusoidal waveform analysis on gross brain parameters, 
white and grey matter volume across the whole brain, and regions in the frontal lobe, all of 
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which were selected on the basis of the neuropsychological literature (Lewis et al., 2012; 
Rilling et al., 2002). 
 
3.1.2. Material and Methods 
Participants  
Eighty-five right-handed Caucasian university students between 19 and 42 (55 
females; mean age=24.03 ± 4.025 SD) participated in the study as part of an imaging cohort 
that underwent detailed phenotyping and genotyping. Data from the same participants were 
used in our study of subcortical volume correlates of human values (Zacharopoulos, 
Lancaster, Bracht, Ihssen, Maio & Linden, 2016). Participants were informed that the study 
examined value-morality judgments with anatomical neuroimaging. Participants gave written 
informed consent, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee of Cardiff 
University. Human value scores beyond three standard deviations away from the mean were 
excluded from the analysis (to induce normality): specifically, if a participant had a score 
falling beyond three standard deviations in a particular value, we merely excluded the outlier 
score and not all the value scores of that participant. We therefore made one exclusion for 
each of six participants, excluding (1) conformity (conservation), (2) myelin volume faction, 
(3) hedonism (openness and self-enhancement), (4) security, or (5) achievement (6) myelin 
volume fraction.  
 
Human Values 
Participants completed the Schwartz value survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), which was 
administered in the laboratory prior to the scanning session. This is a 56-item scale that can 
be used to measure the value types shown in Figure 1.A. Participants are asked to rate the 
importance of each of the 56 values as a guiding principle in their lives, using a quasi-bipolar 
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9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important), 4 (important), to 7 
(of supreme importance). Examples of SVS items are as follows: “Equality: Equal 
opportunity for all” (Universalism); “Pleasure: Gratification of desires” (Hedonism); 
“Obedient: Dutiful meeting obligations” (Conformity). The average score across the 56 items 
was calculated and subtracted from each of the 56 initial raw scores, prior to calculating the 
average of the value scores within each of the 10 value types. Schwartz recommends this 
procedure to help control for superfluous individual variations in rating styles (e.g. Schwartz, 
1992). The reliability for the values was moderate to good (see, Supplementary Material 
2.1.). 
MATRICS Consensus Cognitive Battery 
Participants completed all seven cognitive domains of the MATRICS Consensus 
Cognitive Battery (Nuechterlein & Green, 2006): Speed of processing (Brief Assessment of 
Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS): Symbol-Coding, Category Fluency: Animal Naming, 
Trail Making Test: Part A), Attention/Vigilance (Continuous Performance Test—Identical 
Pairs (CPT-IP), Working memory (Wechsler Memory Scale®—3rd Ed. (WMS®-III): Spatial 
Span, Verbal learning Hopkins Verbal Learning Test—Revised™ (HVLT-R™), Visual 
learning Brief Visuospatial Memory Test—Revised (BVMT-R™), Reasoning and problem 
solving (Neuropsychological Assessment Battery® (NAB®): Mazes, Social cognition 
(Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT™): Managing Emotions).  
MRI Data Acquisition 
MRI images were acquired with a General Electric 3T scanner equipped with an 8HR 
Brain parallel head coil for radio frequency transmission/reception. Anatomical high-
resolution T1-weighted volume scans (1 mm3) were acquired using FSPGR 256*192 3-D 
sequence (TR=7.849ms; TE=2.984ms; field of view=256x256 mm; voxel size=1x1x1 mm). 
Structural Imaging Processing 
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VBM pre-processing and statistical analysis was performed with SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). All structural images were visually 
checked for artefacts. Customized T1 templates and prior images of grey Matter (GM), white 
matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) were created from all participants. For the 
segmentation, we followed the steps provided by the SPM8 guidelines (light bias 
regularisation (0.001), 60mm bias FWHM cut-off, warping regularisation of 4, affine 
regularisation to the ICBM European brain template (linear registration), sampling distance 
of 3). The normalization was performed using the DARTEL method and the images were 
modulated only by the non-linear component (i.e., the affine scaling factor was ignored). 
Finally, the images were smoothed (Ashburner & Friston, 2000) with a Gaussian kernel of 
8mm (FWHM), whereby the intensity of each voxel was replaced by the weighted average of 
the surrounding voxels.  
Relaxometry MRI acquisition  
Myelin measures were derived using Multi-Component Driven Equilibrium Single 
Pulse Observation of T1 and T2 (mcDESPOT) (Deoni, Rutt, Arun, Pierpaoli & Jones, 2008). 
The acquisition consists of Spoiled Gradient Recall (SPGR) images across eight flip angles, 
one inversion recovery SPGR (IR-SPGR) and steady-state free precession (SSFP) images 
across eight flip angles and two phase-cycling angles. All images were acquired in a 3T GE 
HDx MRI system (General Electric Healthcare). A total of 25 images were acquired for each 
subject. All images were acquired in sagittal orientation with a slice matrix of 128x128 
(1.72x1.72mm resolution) with a minimum of 88 slices (slice thickness = 1.7mm). Additional 
slices were added for some subjects to ensure full head coverage.  
Sequence-specific parameters were: SPGR: TE=2.112ms, TR=4.7ms, flip angles = 3°, 
4°, 5°, 6°, 7°, 9°, 13° and 18°. IR-SPGR: TE=2.112ms, TR=4.7ms, IR=450ms, flip angle = 
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5°. SSFP: TE = 1.6ms TR=3.2ms, flip angles of 10.59°, 14.12°, 18.53°, 23.82° 29.12° 35.29°, 
45°, 60° and phase-cycling angles of 0° and 180°.   
mcDESPOT processing  
All images were linearly coregistered to the 13° SPGR image to correct for subject 
motion. Non-brain tissue was removed using a mask computed with the BET algorithm 
(Smith, 2002). Registration and brain masking were performed with FSL 
(http://www.fmrib.ox- .ac.uk/fsl/). The images were then corrected for B1 inhomogeneities 
and off-resonance artefacts, using maps generated from the IR-SPGR and 2 phase-cycling 
SSFP acquisitions, respectively. The 3-pool mcDESPOT algorithm was then used to identify 
a fast (water constrained by myelin) and slow (free-moving water in intra- and extra-cellular 
space) components of the T1 and T2 times, and a non-exchanging free-water component 
(Deoni, Matthews & Kolind, 2013). The fast volume fraction was taken as a map of the 
myelin-water fraction.   
Voxel-based Morphometry (VBM) 
Voxel-based morphometry, implemented in SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) 
and MATLAB (Math-Works, Natick, MA, USA), was utilised to probe the association 
between human value scores and the white (and grey matter) volume. First, MR images were 
segmented into GM, WM and CSF by utilising a method used previously (Ashburner & 
Friston, 2005). The covariates entered in the design matrix were the gender and age of the 
participants. We initially identified the clusters of voxels that exceeded an uncorrected 
threshold of voxel-wise p<0.001. To control for multiple comparisons, we applied a family-
wise error (p(corr)<0.05) correction across the whole-brain volume at a cluster level using 
non-stationary correction.  Regular normalisation (healthy controls) was used in the study. 
The data were pre-processed and analyses using SPM8 using the VBM8 toolbox.  
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Grey and White Matter Structures-Based Correlation Analysis 
Cortical reconstruction and volumetric segmentation of 32 cortical (64 in total, Left 
and Right regions in Supplementary Material 3.1.6) and 7 subcortical (14 in total, Left and 
Right: Amygdala, Accumbens, Caudate, Hippocampus, Pallidum, Putamen, Thalamus) areas 
(Desikan atlas) was performed with the FreeSurfer image analysis suite, which is documented 
and freely available for download on-line (surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). These variables we 
corrected for age gender and Intracranial Volume (ICV). The ICV was extracted using the 
toolbox VBM8 on SPM8 instead of Free Surfer, because it was previously suggested 
(http://freesurfer.net/fswiki/eTIV) that researchers may calculate the ICV from an image 
modality other than Free Surfer when possible. All correlation analyses were performed on 
the Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows version 19.0).  
3.1.3. Results 
Initial Checks  
 To validate Schwartz’s hypothesised circular structure in our sample, two MDS 
analyses (Bilsky et al., 2011) were conducted. The first analysis plotted the 56 value items, 
and the second analysis plotted the 10 value types; both analyses use the respective 
correlation matrix to plot the values in a two dimensional space. The first analysis yielded S-
stress =.167 and Stress I= .274, while the second analysis yielded S-Stress=.032 and a Stress-
I=.115. The stress value is an index of how well the data fit the hypothesized configuration; 
higher stress values signify a poorer configuration. The stress values and the patterns in the 
MDS (see Supplementary Material 3.1.2) supported to a large extent to the structure 
hypothesized by Schwartz (1992). Given this convergence, we proceeded to examine the 
association between the values scores and neuroanatomical indices.  
To rule out a potential confounding effect of intelligence, we performed correlations 
between the human values and all sub-scores of the MATRICS. All correlations (Pearson’s r) 
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were between .29 and -.24, and no correlation survived the multiple comparison correction 
for significance. Thus, intelligence did not have a significant influence on value orientation in 
our sample. 
Fitting the Sinusoidal Model to Whole Brain Indices 
 I tested whether the relationship between brain parameters and value scores followed 
the sinusoidal pattern. This analysis plotted the correlation coefficients between a particular 
brain parameter on the y-axis and each of the 10 lower-order values on the x-axis (in an order 
that follows their circular structure). The results revealed a strong sinusoidal association 
(SFI=.07) between human values and overall white matter volume (Figure 3.1.1, Panel A), 
but no significant association with overall grey matter volume (SFI=.61). To check the 
robustness of the white matter finding, the sinusoidal test was also performed on various 
unmodulated (1-3) and modulated (4) white matter indices: (1) raw white matter while 
controlling for age, gender and intracranial volume (SFI=.13), (2) raw white matter to 
intracranial volume ratio (SFI=.19), (3) raw white matter to intracranial volume ratio while 
controlling for age and gender (SFI=.13) and (4) modulated non-linear only (SFI=.20). In all 
instances, the sine wave was of a similar form (i.e., negatively associated with self-
transcendence and positively with self-enhancement) and the SFI indicated good fit 
(SFI<.20). Of note, intracranial volume was significantly associated with five out of ten 
values: stimulation (r(83)=.27, p=.011), self-direction (r(83)=.26, p=.018), benevolence 
(r(83)=-.27, p=.012) as well as the value dimension of Openness (r(83)=.25, p=.022). To 
control for the potential confound of intelligence, the effect of all the MATRICS domains 
including the total score (i.e., speed of processing, attention/vigilance, working memory, 
verbal learning, visual learning, reasoning and problem solving, Social cognition and the total 
score) was regressed out of each individual value. The SFI was virtually the same (SFI=.10, 
see Supplementary Material 3.1.3).  
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Figure 3.1.1. Correlation coefficients between the 10 value types (x-axis) and the White 
(Panel A) and Grey (Panel B) matter volume (cubic decimetres dm3). 
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The white matter parameter estimate from VBM, however, is not a direct measure of 
myelination, and it can arise from various contributing sources that cannot be discriminated 
with VBM analysis of standard contrast-based MR data. To further test the relationship 
between white matter and human values, the myelin volume fraction of the overall brain was 
obtained using Multicomponent Relaxometry (mcDESPOT) (see Methods, Deoni et al., 
2013).  This enabled a test of the sinusoidal association between human values and myelin 
volume fraction, a direct measure of myelination. As expected, the wave form was sinusoidal 
and exhibited the same form as the white matter volume (SFI=.12, Figure 3.1.2). As was the 
case for white matter volume, the myelin volume fraction was associated with the human 
values even after regressing out the intelligence variables (SFI=.10, see Supplementary 
Material 3.1.3).  
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Figure 3.1.2. Correlation coefficients between the 10 value types (x-axis) and overall myelin 
volume fraction (ratio of myelin-bound water to total water). 
 
Investigation of Regional Differences using Voxel Based Morphometry 
Having identified a sinusoidal association between white matter and the 10 value 
types, it was useful to turn to the specific anatomical contributions. Based on inspection of 
the sinusoidal waveforms, I expected a negative linear association of regional white matter 
volume with the value dimensions of conservation (composed of conformity, security and 
tradition) and self-transcendence (composed of universalism and benevolence). Conversely, 
we expected a positive linear association of regional white matter volume with openness 
(composed of hedonism, self-direction and stimulation) and self-enhancement (composed of 
power, achievement and hedonism).  
When the associations at the level of higher-order value dimensions were examined, 
conservation values were negatively associated with the volume of the white matter 
underlying the parahippocampal and lingual gyri (pFWE=.047; t=4.78, -22-54 4,  Montreal 
Neurological Institute: MNI space, k=1, Figure 3.1.3, Left panel, see also Supplementary 
Material 3.1.8). In addition, self-transcendence was negatively associated with the white 
matter underlying the middle temporal gyrus (pFWE=.009; t=5.27, 60-37 -11, k=30, Figure 
3.1.3, Right Panel).  
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Figure 3.1.3. VBM results for the relations between white matter volume and values: 
Negative association with conservation (pFWE=.047; t=4.80, -22-54 4, k=1, uncorrected 
cluster shown, Top Left Panel), and negative association with self-transcendence 
(pFWE=.009; t=5.27, 60-37 -11, k=30, Top Right Panel). The bottom panels are the scatter-
plots with the human value score on the y-axis and the beta-weights of the corresponding 
regions in the x-axis.  
 
Because of the strong inverse relation between conservation and openness, I tested 
whether these values’ associations with the white matter parameter are underpinned by the 
shared variance between the values. Removing the variance of openness from conservation, 
and vice versa, revealed no significant associations with brain structure. Similarly, when the 
self-enhancement variance was regressed out from self-transcendence, self-transcendence 
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was no longer associated with brain structure. These analyses show that the findings were 
driven by the shared variance of the two opposing ends of the same motivational dimension 
(see Figure 1.A), underlining the importance of the motivational conflicts predicted by 
Schwartz’s (1992) model.  
 
Fitting the Sinusoidal Model to Cortical and Subcortical Regions of Interest  
 Based on the brain imaging and lesion work that indicated the involvement of regions 
across the whole brain as putative structures encoding human values, further analyses probed 
sinusoidal associations between human values and the volume of the structures across the 
whole brain. With respect to the cortical regions, the volume of one frontal brain region 
(Figure 3.1.4), the right medial orbitofrontal cortex (SFI=.15), as well as the thickness of the 
left lateral orbitofrontal and caudal middle frontal regions, exhibited the strongest sinusoidal 
associations with human values (Supplementary Material 3.1.4). As can been seen in 
Supplementary Material 3.1.4, these frontal-related sinusoidal associations were driven by 
higher grey matter volume/thickness for self-transcendence (i.e., highest positive peak of the 
sine wave) and lower grey matter volume/thickness for openness (i.e., highest negative peak 
of the sine wave). With regard to the volume of the 14 subcortical regions, none of them was 
statistcially related to the values in a sinusodal manner.  
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Figure 3.1.4. Correlation coefficients between the 10 value types (x-axis) and the volume 
(mm3) of the right medial orbitofrontal cortex. For completeness, the grey matter regions 
(Supplementary Material 3.1.7) that show a sinusoidal association with human values (i.e., 
SFI<.20) are depicted in Supplementary Material 3.1.4.  
 
Discussion 
The present research investigated the neuroanatomical correlates of human values 
using structural imaging. Three main results emerge from this study. First, the findings 
demonstrated sinusoidal associations between overall white matter volume and the values 
described in Schwartz’s (1992, 2012) cross-cultural model of values. Second, the results 
identified specific white matter regions that were associated with human values, mainly in the 
temporal lobe. Thirdly, the results supported my hypothesis that volumetric differences in the 
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frontal lobes are related to values; this relation was found in prefrontal grey matter, portions 
of which exhibited a sinusoidal waveform of association with human values.  
The main finding here concerns the novel sinusoidal relationship between overall 
white matter volume and myelination and human values. People who attach more importance 
to self-enhancement and openness values possess higher white matter volume, whereas 
people who attach more importance to self-transcendence values possess lower white matter 
volume.  Furthermore, this pattern of association was not influenced by any putative 
confounds with intelligence as assessed by the MATRICS battery. Of course, a nonclinical 
intelligence assessment tool would be a more robust device to employ in future research, but 
the current findings nonetheless indicate that this sinusoidal waveform is an accurate 
description of the associations with values. 
In general, we need to exercise caution when interpreting relatively global brain 
parameters like overall white matter.  It is important to consider such associations in light of 
the findings in more specific brain regions.  In this regard, this study showed that individual 
variability in both conservation and openness orientations is associated with structural 
variability in brain structure. Removing the variance of openness from conservation, and vice 
versa, revealed no significant associations with brain structure. The same effect was observed 
for the second value dimension, self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence. After variance 
related to self-enhancement was removed from self-transcendence, self-transcendence was no 
longer associated with brain structure. This suggests that the findings have been driven by the 
shared variance between the two opposing motivational ends of the same value dimension, 
congruent with Schwartz’s (1992) model. Schwartz’s model indicates that the two opposing 
ends of a value dimension express opposing motivational needs. If this motivational 
opposition is crucial to an association (e.g., the volume of a brain region), then the variance 
shared between the two opposing value types should be a crucial component of the 
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association. This neurostructural evidence therefore provides a novel cross-validation of 
Schwartz’s circumplex model of the motivational relations between values using 
neuroanatomical data. Previously, the motivational oppositions in the circular model of 
values received support at the behavioural level, but here we see new neural markers of the 
motivational oppositions.   
The findings also reveal novel aspects of the psychological functioning of prefrontal 
regions. As noted earlier, prior lesion and fMRI studies demonstrate a link between prefrontal 
regions, mPFC and OFC, and value-related constructs (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel 
& Damasio, 1999; Grafman et al., 1996; Rilling et al., 2002). Here, these findings are 
extended by showing that the right medial OFC is directly related to the whole spectrum of 
human values in a sinusoidal manner, driven especially by higher right medial OFC 
activation among those who attach higher importance to self-transcendence values. This 
evidence ties in with previous structural and functional findings investigating self-
transcendent-related behaviours and deficits. For example, in a voxel-based morphometry 
study (de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008), psychopathic patients (i.e. individuals with moral 
deficits) showed reduced grey matter in a number of regions including OFC. In addition, 
higher mOFC (vmPFC) activity was associated with the higher subjective liking of donations 
at the time of the decision making (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle & Rangel, 2010). 
Of importance, a strong and significant, association between an external variable and 
a particular value does not guarantee that the external variable is associated with the whole 
human value space in a sinusoidal manner (i.e., a good SFI).  That is, sinusoidal relations do 
not depend solely on the correlations between values in the circumplex model (Hanel et al., 
2016).  For example, as can be seen in the results, the 10 correlation coefficients between 
ICV and human values are stronger and more significant (3 of which are at a p<.05) than the 
correlations between white matter volume and human values (none of which is at p<.05). If 
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the sinusoidal pattern were carried by a single strong association, the SFI for ICV should be 
better than the SFI for white matter volume. However, this is not the case; the SFI for ICV is 
worse (SFI>.2) than that for white matter volume. The sinusoidal relationship depends on 
more than the co-variation between the 10 values. There is a great number of inter-human 
value covariance sources with which a given external variable may co-vary.  
Moreover, if this study had employed a research methodology using merely classical 
linear models, I would not have been able to capture all the available information from the 
values and imaging data. The development of a specific test for a sinusoidal pattern is a novel 
data-reduction approach, which increases the power to detect otherwise unobserved 
relationships, and can be utilised for other circumplex models in psychology, such as 
influential circumplex models of affect (Russell, 1980) and personality (Wiggins, 1996). In 
the present project, this methodology helped to combine a well-informed psychological 
model, which features specific predictions, with neuroimaging techniques.  This approach 
enabled more robust modelling of the connections between human values and the brain, but 
this approach can be extended usefully to other domains of psychology. 
 
3.2. A hedonism hub in the human brain 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In the previous sub-section, I illustrated that certain cortical white matter parameters 
(e.g., volume, myelin volume fraction) are consistently associated with human values in a 
sinusoidal way as predicted by the Schwartz’s circumplex model. However, previous work on 
the neurostructural correlates of human values has been exclusively focused on the cortex but 
excluded the subcortical regions. Indeed, the motivational nature of human values raises the 
possibility that they might be underpinned by certain subcortical brain regions that are 
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particularly involved in motivated behavior and reward processing, a hypothesis that has 
never been directly tested.  
As discussed in the general introduction, the putative reward system of the human 
brain is centred on hubs in basal ganglia (striatum and GP) and includes the VTA, prefrontal 
brain regions and parts of the limbic system (Haber & Knutson, 2010). These grey matter 
regions are structurally connected by white matter pathways. At the core of these connection 
pathways is the MFB, which connects the ventral tegmental area (VTA) with the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc), the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC, lOFC) and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Bracht et al., 2014). Two different branches of the 
MFB have been described previously: the infero-medial medial forebrain bundle (imMFB) 
and the supero-lateral medial forebrain bundle (slMFB) (Coenen et al., 2012). The latter may 
be of particular importance for reward processing. However, no study thus far has 
investigated associations between the slMFB and the values most related to reward 
processing: hedonism values. It is the aim of this study to investigate if structural properties 
of basal ganglia and slMFB reflect human values. This aim required examination of 
correlations between human value scores, as assessed by the Schwartz Value Scale 
(Schwartz, 1992), and the volume of 14 subcortical areas (left and right: GP, thalamus, 
caudate nucleus, putamen, hippocampus, amygdala, nucleus accumbens) as well as the 
slMFB that connects many of these regions. I hypothesized a positive association between the 
hedonism score and the microstructural parameters within slMFB as well as the volume of 
the subcortical regions connected to slMFB.  
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3.2.2. Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Eighty-seven right-handed Caucasian university students between 19 and 42 (56 females; 
mean age=23.97 ± 3.92 SD) participated in the study, all of whom were university students or 
graduates. Participants were informed that the study examined value-morality judgments with 
anatomical neuroimaging. Participants gave written informed consent, and the study was 
approved by the local ethics committee of Cardiff University. Human value scores beyond 
three standard deviations away from the mean were excluded from the analysis. I identified 
one such instance in three (hedonism, achievement, conformity) out of ten values.   
 
MRI Data Acquisition 
All MRI Data were acquired in the Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre 
(CUBRIC) on a 3 T GE SignaHDx system (General Electric, Milwaukee, USA) equipped 
with an 8HR Brain parallel head coil for radio frequency transmission/reception. 
 
Structural MRI  
Anatomical high-resolution T1-weighted volume scans (1 mm3) were acquired using a fast 
spoiled gradient echo (FSPGR) 3-D sequence (TR=7.849ms; TE=2.984ms; field of 
view=256x256 mm; voxel size=1x1x1 mm). 
 
Multi-component relaxometry  
Myelin measures were derived using Multi-Component Driven Equilibrium Single Pulse 
Observation of T1 and T2 (mcDESPOT) (Deoni et al., 2008). The acquisition consists of 
Spoiled Gradient Recall (SPGR) images across eight flip angles, one inversion recovery 
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SPGR (IR-SPGR) and steady-state free precession (SSFP) images across eight flip angles and 
two phase-cycling angles. A total of 25 images were acquired for each subject. All images 
were acquired in sagittal orientation with a slice matrix of 128x128 (1.72x1.72mm resolution) 
with a minimum of 88 slices (slice thickness = 1.7mm). Sequence-specific parameters were: 
SPGR: TE=2.112ms, TR=4.7ms, flip angles = 3°, 4°, 5°, 6°, 7°, 9°, 13° and 18°. IR-SPGR: 
TE=2.112ms, TR=4.7ms, IR=450ms, flipangle = 5°. SSFP: TE = 1.6ms TR=3.2ms, flip 
angles of 10.59°, 14.12°, 18.53°, 23.82° 29.12° 35.29°, 45°, 60° and phase-cycling angles of 
0° and 180°.   
 
Diffusion weighted imaging 
Diffusion MRI comprising a cardiac-gated diffusion-weighted spin-echo echo-planar imaging 
sequence was used to acquire high angular resolution diffusion weighted images (HARDI). 
30 gradient orientations (b=1200 s/mm2) and 3 unweighted (b=0 s/mm2) images were 
acquired with the following parameters: TE=87 ms, 60 slices, slice thickness=2.4mm, 
FoV=230×230 mm, acquisition matrix=96×96, resulting in data acquired with a 
2.4×2.4×2.4mm isotropic resolution following zero-filling to a 128x128 in-plane matrix for 
the fast Fourier transform. The final image resolution was therefore 1.8×1.8×2.4mm. 
 
Pre-processing 
Structural MRI  
Cortical reconstruction and volumetric segmentation of 14 subcortical areas (Supplementary 
Material 3.2.1. left and right: GP, thalamus, caudate nucleus, putamen, hippocampus, 
amygdala, nucleus accumbens) was performed with FreeSurfer image analysis software 
v4.4.0, which is documented and freely available for download on-line 
(surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). All correlation analyses were performed on the Software 
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Package for Statistical Analysis (SPSS for Windows version 19.0). As subcortical volume 
may be confounded by age, gender and overall intra-cranial volume (ICV) we controlled for 
these effects in the regression analysis ICV derived from VBM8 (Gaser, 2009), SPM8, 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8).  
 
 
Multi-component relaxometry 
All images were linearly co-registered to the 13° SPGR image to correct for subject 
motion. Non-brain tissue was removed using a mask computed with the BET algorithm 
(Smith, 2002). Registration and brain masking were performed with FSL 
(http://www.fmrib.ox- .ac.uk/fsl/). The images were then corrected for B1 inhomogeneities 
and off-resonance artefacts, using maps generated from the IR-SPGR and 2 phase-cycling 
SSFP acquisitions, respectively. The 3-pool mcDESPOT algorithm was then used to identify 
a fast (water constrained by myelin) and slow (free-moving water in intra- and extra-cellular 
space) components of the T1 and T2 times, and a non-exchanging free-water component 
(Deoni et al., 2013). The fast water fraction was taken as a map of the myelin-water fraction.  
 
Diffusion MRI 
Data were analysed using ExploreDTI 4.8.3 (Leemans, Jeurissen, Sijbers & Jones, 
2009). Eddy-current induced distortion and motion correction was performed using an affine 
registration to the non-diffusion-weighted B0-images, with appropriate re-orienting of the 
encoding vectors (Leemans & Jones, 2009). Field non-homogeneities were corrected for 
using the approach of (Wu et al., 2008). The diffusion weighted images (DWIs) were non-
linearly warped to the T1-weighted image using the fractional anisotropy map, calculated 
from the DWIs, as a reference. Warps were computed using Elastix (Klein, Staring, Murphy, 
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Viergever & Pluim, 2010) using normalized mutual information as the cost function and 
constraining deformations to the phase-encoding direction. The corrected DWIs were 
therefore transformed to the same (undistorted) space as the T1-weighted structural images. A 
single diffusion tensor model was fitted to the diffusion data in order to compute quantitative 
parameters such as FA (Basser, Mattiello & LeBihan, 1994). A correction for free water 
contamination of the diffusion tensor based estimates was applied, before sampling diffusion 
properties (e.g., FA) along the fornix and the PHC (Pasternak, Sochen, Gur, Intrator & Assaf. 
2009; Metzler-Baddeley, O'Sullivan, Bells, Pasternak & Jones, 2012). The fractional 
anisotropy (FA), radial, axial, and mean diffusivities (RD, AD, MD) was then computed from 
the DT. 
 
Tractography of the supero-lateral medial forebrain bundle 
Whole brain tractography was performed using the damped Richardson-Lucy 
algorithm (Dell’acqua et al., 2010), and an algorithm similar to that described by (Basser et 
al., 1994). Termination criteria were an angle threshold > 45 degrees and FA < 0.2.  The 
slMFB was reconstructed as described in (Bracht, Doidge, Keedwell & Jones, 2015). One 
horizontal ROI was placed surrounding the ventral tegmental area (VTA). Anatomical 
borders were laterally the substantia nigra, anteriorly the mammillary bodies and posteriorly 
the red nucleus (Nieuwenhuys, Voogd & Huijzen, 2008). A second ROI was drawn 
surrounding caudate and putamen on a coronal section at the height of the nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc). Due to the particular interest in the role of the MFB in reward processing, the focus 
was placed on segments of the slMFB dorsal to the VTA including projections from the VTA 
to NAcc, GP, hypothalamus and the OFC, core regions of reward processing. 
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Human Values 
Participants completed the Schwartz value survey (SVS; Schwartz 1992), which was 
administered in the laboratory prior to the scanning session. Participants were asked to rate 
how important each of 56 values is as a guiding principle in their lives, using a quasi-bipolar 
9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important), 4 (important), to 7 
(of supreme importance). Examples of SVS items are as follows: “Equality: Equal 
opportunity for all” (Universalism); “Pleasure: Gratification of desires” (Hedonism); 
“Obedient: Dutiful meeting obligations” (Conformity). The average score across the 56 items 
was then calculated and subtracted from each of the 56 initial raw scores. Schwartz 
recommends this procedure to help control for superfluous individual variations in rating 
styles (e.g. Schwartz 1992). The raw value distribution of the Schwartz Value Survey can be 
seen in Supplementary Material 3.2.3. The internal consistency, as measured by the 
Cronbach’s alpha, of these indices was moderate to good (Supplementary Material 2.1.). 
Moreover, to validate Schwartz’s hypothesised circular structure in our sample, I conducted 
two Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) analyses (Bilsky et al., 2011). The first analysis 
plotted the 56 value items, and the second analysis plotted the 10 higher-order values; both 
analyses used the respective correlation matrix to plot the values in a two dimensional space. 
The first analysis yielded S-stress =.167 and Stress I= .274, while the second one yielded S-
Stress=.032 and a Stress-I=.115. The stress value is an index of how well the data fit the 
hypothesized configuration; higher stress values signify a poorer configuration. The stress 
values and the patterns in the MDS (Supplementary Material 3.1.2) supported to a large 
extent to the structure hypothesized by Schwartz (1992).   
Of greater interest were the correlations between the human value scores (i.e. 10 
values) and the residual scores of all 14 subcortical measures as well as 5 medial forebrain 
bundle microstructural measures (after regressing out the age, gender and intracranial volume 
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or overall microstructural properties). A Bonferroni correction was calculated using the RTM 
3.0.2. software package using the code, p.adjust(p, method = "bonferroni"). Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals (95%) were computed using AMOS software. To conduct an internal 
replication analysis of the primary findings, the correlations were calculated in two randomly 
selected subsets of the participant sample. The volume of left GP significantly predicted 
hedonism scores in both sub-samples, r(42)=425, p=.005;  r(43)=.353, p=.02. 
 
3.2.3. Results 
The first analyses compared the volume of the left to the right GP. Left GP (M=1667 
mm3) was significantly larger (t(86)=p<.00001) than the right (M=1490 mm3), as reported 
previously (Kooistra & Heilman, 1988). I then investigated the association between the 
subcortical volume of 14 structures, as well as 5 microstructual properties of the slMFB, and 
the 10 human values. After a robust (Bonferroni) multiple comparison correction (i.e., 10 
values x (14 subcortical structures+5 slMFB measures)), the results indicated that people who 
rated hedonism as important in their life had a larger GP in the left hemisphere, r(84)=.393, 
p(BONF)=.035 (Figure 3.2.) ((p(UNCORR)=.000182). The robustness of the association between 
left GP volume and hedonism score was confirmed by internal replication (Material, Human 
Values section) and bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals: r=.393 lower=.232 upper=.537 
p=.002 (N=1000), r=.398 lower=.241 upper=.540 p<.0005 (N=5000)). The next highest 
correlation between any value and any of the examined brain areas was observed for 
stimulation and the volume of the left GP, r(85)=.231, p(UNCORR)=.032, although this 
correlation did not reach the corrected significance level. The relationship between hedonism 
score and left GP when including the outlier scores was rs(85)=.398, p(UNCORR)=.000134; 
p(BONF)=.025. In addition, similar to left GP, the right GP was also positively related to 
hedonism (r(84)=.218, p(UNCORR)=.044), but this association did not survive the Bonferroni 
62 
 
correction. Because of this relative difference between left and right, I also examined whether 
the left minus right GP volume may be associated to hedonism. Indeed, there is a positive 
association between the left minus right GP volume and hedonism r(84)=.266, 
p(UNCORR)=.013 (the correlation coefficient can be seen in Supplementary Material 3.2.4. For 
completeness, the association between the rest of subcortical measures and hedonism can be 
seen in Supplementary Material 3.2.3. This pattern of associations suggests that hedonism is 
specifically related to GP and not to any other subcortical structure.   
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Figure 3.2. A 3d-mesh of the left GP (above) and a scatter-plot of the correlation 
(r(84)=.393, p(BONF)=.035) between the volume of the left GP (i.e., the residual scores with 
age, gender and intracranial volume regressed out) (x-axis) and the standardized hedonism 
scores (y-axis). Each dot represents one participant. The volume of the left GP significantly 
predicts hedonism scores. Grey shading around the regression line represents the 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
Although none of the slMFB and hedonism survived the aforementioned Bonferroni 
correction, we present here the strongest slMFB associations to hedonism. There was a 
positive association between the myelin volume fraction of the left slMFB, r(79)=.312, 
p(UNCORR)=.005) (Supplementary Material 3.2.3) and right slMFB, r(79)=.266, p(UNCORR)=. 
=.017, (corrected for overall whole brain myelin volume fraction, age and gender) and 
hedonism. These associations still hold, at an uncorrected level, when correcting for overall 
white matter restricted myelin volume fraction, age and gender (Left, r(79)=.245, 
p(UNCORR)=.028; Right, r(79)=.220, p(UNCORR) =.049). For completeness, we present the 
association between hedonism and Fractional Anisotropy, Medial Diffusivity, Radial 
Diffusivity and L1 of left and right MFB (Supplementary Material 3.2.3).  
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the neural representation of the motivational nature of 
human values by testing for associations between the scores of 10 values and the volume of 
14 subcortical regions as well as the myelin volume fraction of slMFB. The results 
demonstrate, for the first time, a direct association between the value that people attach to 
hedonism and the volume of a specific brain structure, the left GP as well as the myelin 
volume fraction of slMFB.   
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The slMFB has been previously associated to hedonic-related mechanisms (Bracht, 
Linden & Keedwell, 2015). Specifically Bracht et al. (2014) found that mean-FA within the 
MFB was correlated negatively with depression scale rating scores. In contrast to the 
direction of this finding, Bracht et al. (2015) found that hedonic capacity was correlated 
negatively with mean FA of the left slMFB. The present research calculated both FA and 
MWF of the slMFB, but only the MWF showed a clear trend with hedonism. Compared to 
FA, MWF is considered a more biologically interpretable proxy of white matter myelination. 
Myelin enables faster and more efficient propagation of action potentials along axonal 
pathways, which in turn can contribute to faster information processing capabilities (Turken 
et al., 2008). Specifically, it provides more information about the tissue composition of white 
matter connections, independent of volume (to which other parameters such as axon diameter 
and inter-axonal space can contribute).  
GP is a relatively large subcortical structure which is in a dorsal and a ventral 
segment. The dorsal segment is particularly implicated in motor control, while the ventral 
segment, which receives input from the nucleus accumbens, has been involved in hedonic-
related processing (see below). The GP region in the present study includes both dorsal and 
ventral GP segments (Supplementary Material 3.2.1). The GP is a central node not only in the 
direct and indirect pathways that govern motor control (underpinned mainly by the dorsal 
segment), but also in the “executive” and “limbic” circuits of the basal ganglia (Rodriguez et 
al., 2009). The limbic circuit, in particular, has been implicated in motivated behavior.  This 
circuit originates from the projections of the ventral striatum to the GP and continues to the 
thalamus. Inferences from the size of a region onto its function are limited, but one might 
speculate that a larger volume of the GP, presumably reflecting a higher number of neurons 
and/or more neuropil, would result in hypermotivated states, such as those associated with 
hedonism. Previous lesion studies have indeed implicated the GP in reward activation. For 
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example, Rochat et al. (2013) conducted a voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping, which 
showed that damage to the GP was associated with poorer reward sensitivity. In addition, a 
case study described a patient who developed severe anhedonia after he sustained bilateral 
GP lesions (Miller et al., 2006).  
With respect to laterality, it has been previously demonstrated (Kooistra & Heilman, 
1988) that the left GP is often larger than the right GP and this finding was replicated here.  A 
previous study (Glick, Ross & Hough, 1982) on neurochemical asymmetries showed a 
leftward asymmetry in dopamine levels in GP. A later study (Lauterbach, Jackson, Wilson, 
Dever & Kirsh, 1997) on focal subcortical lesion patients, suggested that depression onset 
may be caused specifically after left posterior GP lesions potentially by disturbing basal 
ganglia thalamocortical mood circuits. Taken together, these structural, neurochemical and 
lesion laterality studies suggest that the left GP is a subcortical structure particularly 
associated with the maintenance of healthy reward-related mechanisms. 
Functional imaging studies have also supported the role of GP in reward sensitivity. A 
recent meta-analysis (Arsalidou, Duerden & Taylor, 2013) revealed the involvement of the 
left lateral GP in reward processing and of the left medial GP in tasks that required eliciting 
or judging emotions. Lastly, prior animal work supports a hedonic function for networks 
involving the GP. For example, Ho and Berridge (2013) investigated the neuronal 
connections of the orexin terminals in the posterior half of ventral pallidum, a region in close 
proximity to opioidergic hedonism “hotspots”. By injecting orexin-A into this region, they 
enhanced the hedonic impact of sucrose, as assessed via affective taste reactivity (Ho & 
Berridge 2013). 
The present study, which is the first to demonstrate a robust role for the GP in hedonism in 
healthy humans, thus fits with neuropsychological and animal models of “wanting” and 
“liking” (Smith, Berridge & Aldridge,  2011). The results have potential implications for both 
66 
 
clinical and social neuroscience. Individual variation in GP volume might partly determine 
susceptibility to hedonic deficits associated with addiction or mood disorders.  More broadly, 
it is also possible that this variation might contribute to our understanding of the role of 
impulsive, hedonistic inclinations in a number of difficult societal behavior change issues, 
such as attempts to attenuate increasing levels of obesity, damage to the environment, and 
antisocial behavior (see Maio et al., 2008 for a review). 
Another important question is whether larger GP volume leads to high importance of 
hedonism or vice-versa. Previous behavioural genetics studies (Shermer et al., 2008, 2011; 
Zacharopoulos, Lancaster, Maio & Linden, 2016) demonstrated that human values may have 
genetic aetiology. However, the behavioural genetics of human values is a relatively new 
field and thus knowledge on the specific genetic markers for particular human values, such as 
hedonism, are still poorly understood. The findings of the present study provide the first 
endophenotype (i.e., volumetric variation in the GP) that may mediate the association 
between specific genetic markers and hedonism. The direction of the GP-hedonism link can 
be determined in future mediational studies. In particular, if the relationship between specific 
genetic components and the relative importance of hedonism is mediated by the volumetric 
variation of left GP, while the relationship between the same genetic components and 
volumetric variation of left GP is not mediated by hedonism, then one could make the case 
for left GP volume causes changes in the subjective value of hedonism. 
In sum, the present research (a) demonstrated a strong positive association between 
the volume of left GP and the human value of hedonism, and (b) extended prior findings on 
the association between hedonic processes and the microstructural properties of slMFB. 
Together, these results provide the first direct association between the importance people 
attach to the human value of hedonism and structural variation in reward-related subcortical 
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brain regions.  This provides a novel source of evidence pertinent to affective neuroscience 
research on reward-related deficits, such as the anhedonia in major depression.  
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Human Values on Personal and Social Foraging Behaviour  
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the neuroanatomical link between values and 
reward-related processing. Here I conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
experiment with the aim to investigate how human values affect reward-related processing at 
the level of actual behaviour, in particular prosocial behaviour, and the associated neural 
underpinnings. Specifically, I study the neural correlates of foraging behaviour (see below) 
because the effect of human values on prosocial behaviour in foraging tasks has never been 
addressed before.  
Many life decisions can be conceptualised as foraging problems (Charnov, 1976; 
Constantino & Daw, 2015).  Employment decisions, mate selection, and internet searches are 
just a few examples of scenarios wherein people must choose whether to engage with the 
currently available options or to search for alternative ones. To solve this type of problem, an 
ideal forager compares the value of two strategies -- engaging with the currently available 
option or foregoing it to search for alternatives -- and chooses the one of highest value. This 
is the optimal solution described in the Marginal Value Theorem (Charnov, 1976), which 
requires comparing the value of the current option to the overall value of the alternative, 
foraging environment. 
Due to their ubiquity in everyday decisions, there has been a recent interest in the 
behavioural and neural aspects of foraging problems. Previous neuroimaging studies have 
primarily focused on foraging for oneself (Kolling et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2014; 
Constantino & Daw, 2015).  This focus ignores the fact that both humans and animals often 
forage on behalf of other conspecifics. To my knowledge, there are no existing experiments 
contrasting personal and social foraging in order to examine their potential behavioural and 
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neural differences. Valuing another person’s welfare, or indeed failing to do so, has diverse 
potential implications in our myriad foraging decisions within the human social environment.  
An open question is whether the foraging for others involves substantively different 
psychological and neural processes from foraging for the self, and whether this depends on 
individual differences. Understanding how selfish and prosocial brains function differently 
with regard to valuing the welfare of others in a forage context may have a beneficial societal 
impact.  
Particularly relevant individual differences are human value orientations.  Here, as in 
the earlier chapters, it is useful to utilise Schwartz’s (1992, Figure 4.1; 2012) Circumplex 
Model of Values, which has been validated in over 80 nations, and been subjected to 
experimental, longitudinal, and cross-sectional tests (Maio, 2010). Of particular relevance 
here is the contrast between self-focused values and social-focused values (Schwartz et al., 
2012, for an overview of the value model, see Supplementary Material 3.1.1) 
 
 
70 
 
Figure 4.1. The circumplex structure of human values (modified from Schwartz, 1992). Self-
focused individuals score high on the value types self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power and security, while the social-focused individuals score high on 
universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. 
 
This personal vs social distinction in values should be pivotal in how people construe 
personal vs social foraging tasks. While personal foraging behaviour should be influenced by 
how people assign reward value to choices that have varying degrees of personal costs and 
benefits, the social foraging behaviour should be influenced by how people assign reward 
value to choices that have varying degrees of costs and benefits for others.  These reward 
assignments are conceptually linked to individual differences in the extent to which people 
prioritize these personal or social concerns. In line with previous findings in classical 
economic decision making involving charitable donations (Brosch et al., 2011), the key 
prediction of this study is that personal/self-focused individuals will gather more money for 
themselves (personal foraging) than for charity (social foraging). The aforementioned work 
(Kolling et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2014; Constantino & Daw, 2015) demonstrated 
individual variation in foraging behaviour for the self, but provided little information on 
putative determinants of this variation. Thus, it is important to test whether, for example, a 
self-focused individual may obtain more reward during personal foraging than a social-
focused person.  
It is also important to understand how individual variation in human values affects the 
process of foraging, and not just the amount of foraging for the self vs others. It is 
conceivable that this individual variation affects the parameters that are considered within 
foraging decisions.  For example, self-focused individuals may rely more strongly (compute 
differently) the overall foraging value than social-focused individuals for personal foraging, 
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but not for social foraging. If the process is different, then this suggests that research needs to 
model such differences in order to better understand personal and social foraging. 
Alternatively, if the parameters of foraging decisions are comparable, then the task may be 
mechanistically equivalent to people, regardless of whether it emphasises personal or social 
rewards.   
This chapter presents two experiments that were designed to examine the behavioural 
and neural correlates of these issues. In both experiments, participants alternated between 
foraging for themselves and foraging for a charity of their choice. In Experiment 1, 
participants decided whether to engage with a given choice of options or to keep looking for 
better options (foraging). When they chose to engage with a given option, they were asked to 
make a classical economic decision between two outcomes with known reward magnitudes 
and probabilities. In Experiment 2, participants were presented with a video simulation of 
apple harvesting.  They were presented with an apple tree and asked to decide whether to 
harvest it for apples and incur a short harvest delay, or move to a new tree and incur a longer 
travel delay. The design of Experiment 1 was useful because it involves two distinct modes of 
decision making, and thus allowed the investigation of how human values may affect 
behaviour and associated neural systems during foraging and during classical economic 
decision making separately. Therefore another key hypothesis in this study is whether there is 
a differential involvement of the previously identified neural regions during the foraging 
decision and the classical economic decision between the self and charity trials (see below) 
and most crucially the modulation of these differences based on the self-focus score.  
The design of Experiment 2, which only included the foraging stage (equivalent to 
stage 1 of Exp. 1 below), was useful for testing whether similar patterns of behaviour are 
obtained in a foraging design directly related to the classical animal foraging literature (e.g. 
Stephens & Krebs, 1987; Charnov, 1976). Because several analyses could be replicated 
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across these experiments, they are presented together below.  For simplicity in this combined 
presentation, Experiment 1 is abbreviated as EXP 1 and Experiment 2 as EXP2. 
4.2. Material and Methods 
Participants  
Thirty undergraduate and postgraduate university students between 18 and 37 years of 
age (9 males) took part in the study. Participants were informed that the study investigates the 
neural (EXP 1) and behavioural (EXP 1 & EXP 2) mechanisms of foraging behaviour. All 
participants completed EXP 1 before EXP 2. For the behavioural analysis In EXP 1, three 
participants were excluded because of incomplete scanning sessions, and one participant was 
excluded because she foraged fewer than seven times (i.e., only once) during social foraging 
(Kolling et al., 2012 exclusion criterion). For the neuroimaging analysis in EXP1 apart from 
these four participants, seven additional participants were excluded because of excessive 
motion in that at least a single image exceeded a voxel’s worth of motion >2mm during 
realignment within a single run. In EXP 2, one participant was excluded because of excessive 
time outs (i.e., more than 3 standard deviations above the mean). The study was approved by 
the Cardiff University School of Psychology ethics committee, and all participants gave 
written informed consent.  
 
Experimental design and task  
Charity Selection  
Participants were explicitly informed during the instruction phase of the experiment 
that the number of points (EXP1) or apples (EXP2) would be converted into real money at 
the end of the experiment, and that the reward obtained during personal foraging would be 
paid to them (on top of the fixed participation payment, £15, EXP1 and £6, EXP2), while the 
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reward obtained during social foraging would be given to the charity. Participants then were 
asked to select one from the following charities: British Red Cross, Save the Children Fund, 
Oxfam, The Salvation Army, Cancer Research UK, Macmillan Cancer Support. Participants 
were free to choose different charities in the two experiments.  
EXP 1 
In EXP 1, participants performed a decision-making task (Kolling et al., 2012; 
Shenhav et al., 2014, Figure 4.2., Panel A), which involved two stages.  In Stage 1, 
participants decided whether to engage with a given choice of options or to keep looking for 
better options (foraging).  In Stage 2, participants made a classical economic decision 
between two outcomes with known reward magnitudes and probabilities.  On each trial in 
Stage 1 (upper panels, Figure 4.2.A), participants were offered a pair of potential rewards 
(large numbers). They could choose to forage for a better pair of rewards from the set shown 
at the top of the screen (smaller numbers in the red box), in which case a random pair from 
that set was swapped with the current offer. Participants who made this choice would incur a 
forage cost (shown on the left, below the red box) and a delay until the new choice was 
shown. Participants could forage any number of times (or not at all) before opting to proceed 
to Stage 2 (lower panel). Once they entered Stage 2, a probability was randomly assigned to 
each of the reward options (height of violet bar beside each number), and participants were 
prompted to choose one of the magnitude-probability pairs. Participants received the outcome 
of the gamble on each Stage 2 trial, and these were displayed as accumulating points at the 
bottom of the screen (not shown).  
Participants completed a total of eight fMRI runs (4: personal foraging, 4: social 
foraging). Before each of the 8 blocks, participants were informed with a short message on 
the screen whether the forthcoming block was personal or social. Participants experienced the 
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foraging conditions in one of two orders: (1) personal, social, personal, social, social, 
personal, personal, social or (2) social, personal, social, personal, personal, social, social, 
personal. A block typically lasted for 11 minutes.  
The analysis of the behavioural data of EXP 1 focused on the reward during (1) 
personal foraging (i.e., the total number of points obtained for self during the four personal 
foraging runs), (2) social foraging (i.e., the total number of points given to the charity during 
the four social foraging runs) and (3) the difference of the two (i.e., the reward obtained for 
self minus the reward given to the charity).  
 
EXP 2 
In EXP 2, participants completed an adapted version of a virtual patch-foraging task 
(Figure 4.2.B; Constantino & Daw, 2015). Each run consisted of approximately 50 trials. 
Participants foraged (Figure 4.2.B) for apples in four 14-min (i.e., 7m Personal Foraging, 7m 
Social Foraging) virtual patch-foraging orchards (i.e., Long-Shallow, Long-Steep, Short-
Shallow, Short-Steep). The recipient of reward (i.e., self, charity) was signalled with a letter 
(“S”, self, or “O”, other) that was presented throughout each block (not shown in the figure). 
On each trial, participants were presented with a tree and had to decide whether to 
harvest it for apples and incur a short harvest delay, or move to a new tree and incur a longer 
travel delay. Harvests at a tree earned apples, albeit at an exponentially decelerating rate. 
Similar to Constantino and Daw’s (2015) study, this experiment varied the quality of the 
foraging context by manipulating two environmental parameters: depletion rate and travel 
time. The depletion rate determines the rate at which earned apples decrease with subsequent 
harvest decisions at a given tree. It is a fixed multiplicative decay κ, such that if a participant 
harvests 8 apples in the current trial, the number of apples to be harvested in the next trial 
75 
 
will be the depletion rate multiplied by 8. By manipulating the depletion rate, the experiment 
included one environment with fast depletion (steep) and one with slower depletion 
(shallow). Additionally, it included two more types of orchards -- long (9s) and short (6s) – 
by manipulating the travel time, the time it takes to travel to a new tree. Combining these two 
manipulations resulted in the four orchard-types that participants visited during the task: 
Long-Shallow, Long-Steep, Short-Shallow, Short-Steep.  
New trees were drawn from a Gaussian distribution and the environmental richness or 
opportunity cost of time was varied across blocks by changing the travel time and/or the 
apple depletion rate (see below). The quality of the tree, depletion rate, and richness of the 
environment were a priori unknown to the subject. The aim of the participants was to 
maximize their reward (i.e., number of apples) for themselves or for a charity of their choice, 
depending on their assigned experimental condition. Similar to EXP 1, this was a within-
subject design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
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Figure 4.2. Graphical depictions of a trial in Experiment 1 (Panel A, adapted from Shenhav 
et al., 2014) and Experiment 2 (Panel B, adapted from Constantino & Daw, 2015).  
 
Participants foraged in each orchard for a fixed amount of time: 14m (7m personal 
and 7m for social foraging). Similar to EXP 1, EXP 2 focused on the reward during (1) 
personal foraging (i.e., the total number of apples obtained for self during the personal 
foraging), (2) social foraging (i.e., the total number of apples given to the charity during the 
social foraging), and (3) the difference of the two (i.e., the reward obtained for self minus the 
reward given to the charity). In addition to the reward, EXP 2 looked at individual exit 
thresholds, defined as the mean number of apples at which the participants choose to switch 
to a new tree in each of the environment types. This was calculated by averaging the number 
of apples at exit across trees in a given orchard. For example, an exit threshold of 9 means 
that participants tended to leave a tree when the last harvest yielded 9 apples. Each orchard 
has an optimal, average reward-maximizing exit threshold given by the Marginal Value 
Theorem (Charnov, 1976). A higher than optimal empirical exit threshold signals 
underharvesting bias (i.e., leaving trees too early), while one that falls below the optimal 
threshold signals an overharvesting bias (i.e., staying with trees too long). For the purposes of 
this study, the exit threshold was calculated separately for personal and social foraging.  
 
MRI Data Acquisition 
 
All MRI Data were acquired at the Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre 
(CUBRIC) on a 3 T GE SignaHDx system (General Electric, Milwaukee, USA) equipped 
with an 8HR Brain parallel head coil for radio frequency transmission/reception. 
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Structural MRI  
Anatomical high-resolution T1-weighted volume scans (1 mm3) were acquired using a 
fast spoiled gradient echo (FSPGR) 3-D sequence (TR=7.849ms; TE=2.984ms; field of 
view=256x256 mm; voxel size=1x1x1 mm). 
 
Functional MRI  
Functional images were acquired with a gradient-echo EPI sequence [repetition time 
(TR) 3000ms, echo time (TE) = 30ms, flip angle 87°, gap=1mm, number of slices=43, voxel 
dimension=3.5x3.5x4.4, tilted 15° relative to the AC/PC plane). 
 
MRI Data Pre-processing 
The general procedure for fMRI analysis was similar to a previous study of non-social 
foraging (Shenhav et al., 2014). Imaging data were analyzed in SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Functional 
volumes were motion corrected, normalized to a standardized (MNI) template (including 
resampling to 2mm isotropic voxels), spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8mm 
FWHM), and high-pass filtered (0.01 Hz cut-off). Separate regressors were included for the 
Stage 1 and Stage 2 decision phases. These regressors were all modelled as stick functions 
(which sets the duration of events to 0 and the event is modelled using HRF, GLM#1). 
GLM#2 featured the two main predictors of GLM#1 but additionally included separate 
parametric regressors. Stage 1 featured 3 parametric regressors: (i) task difficulty, (ii), search 
evidence (iii) search cost (i.e., the amount of points the participant will deterministically lose 
if they choose to forage) while Stage 2 featured one parametric regressor, relative value (i.e., 
the difference between reward magnitude of the left option * reward probability of the left 
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option and the reward magnitude of right option * reward probability of the right option). All 
analysis presented below refer to GLM#1 unless the replication analysis. In all SPM analysis, 
the extent threshold was set at 50 voxels, and the text below reports the clusters that survived 
an FWE-cluster level correction at an uncorrected p-value of 0.01 (apart from the replication 
analysis which was performed at a FWE-voxelwise level). Of note, all clusters presented 
below also survived an FWE-cluster level correction at an uncorrected p-value of 0.001. 
Human Values 
Participants completed the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). As 
described earlier in this thesis, this 56-item scale can be used to measure the value types 
shown in Figure 4.1. Participants are asked to rate the importance of each of the 56 values as 
a guiding principle in their lives, using a quasi-bipolar 9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed 
to my values), 0 (not important), 4 (important), to 7 (of supreme importance). Examples of 
SVS items are as follows: “Equality: Equal opportunity for all” (Universalism); “Pleasure: 
Gratification of desires” (Hedonism); “Obedient: Dutiful meeting obligations” (Conformity). 
The average score across the 56 items was calculated and subtracted from each of the 56 
initial raw scores, prior to calculating the average of the value scores within each of the 10 
value types. Schwartz recommends this procedure to help control for superfluous individual 
variations in rating styles (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). The self-focus score was calculated from the 
average score of self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and security 
values. The social-focus score was calculated from the average score of universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity and security values. The behavioural human-value related 
statistical analyses were conducted using a one-tail test because there was a directional 
hypothesis derived from research by Brosch et al. (2011) -- self-focus should be positively 
associated with points obtained during personal foraging -- and because this threshold is 
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relatively efficient on a relatively small (when considering individual variation studies) 
sample size.  
4.3. Results 
Behavioural data (EXP 1 & 2) 
The analyses first compared the decision weights between personal and social 
foraging (i.e., personal beta-weight minus social beta-weight) for EXP 1 (Figure 4.3, Panel 
top left). Results indicated no significant difference in any of the estimates (beta-weights 
from binary logistic regression for Stage 1 and Stage 2, Figure 4.3, Panel top left) or in the 
number of points, number of forages or amount of incurred cost (Figure 4.3, Panel top right). 
The outcome of EXP 2 (Figure 4.3, bottom Panels) was similar: As shown in Figure 4.3, 
there was no difference in the number of apples (t=.088, p=.931, two-tailed) or exit 
thresholds (t=1.449, p=.158, two-tailed) between the personal and social foraging scenarios. 
Taken together, this data reveals no difference between participants’ approaches to the 
personal and social foraging tasks in both foraging experiments. 
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Figure 4.3. All variables in the figure represent the personal minus social foraging (top 
panels are from EXP1 and bottom panels are from EXP 2). In the top left panel, the Stage 1 
intercept is the constant from the foraging binary logistic regression predicting foraging vs 
engaging based on 6 continuous predictors the beta-weights of which are plotted here (the 
higher engaging value, the lower engaging value, highest foraging value, average foraging 
value, lowest foraging value, search cost). In the top right panel, the Stage 2 intercept is the 
constant from the classical economic decision making.  The binary logistic regression 
predicted the left or right option, with beta-weights for reward and probability. In the top 
right panel, the number of overall points, number of overall forages and number of overall 
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cost incurred is represented. The bottom left panel shows the number of apples in each of the 
four orchards (Long Shallow, Long Steep, Short Shallow, Short Steep) and across all four. 
The bottom right panel shows the exit threshold in each of the four orchards (Long Shallow, 
Long Steep, Short Shallow, Short Steep) and across all four.  
I then tested the association between self-focused values and reward during personal 
and social foraging. Participants who exhibited higher self-focus score earned higher overall 
reward during personal foraging in EXP 1 (r(24)=.413, p=.016, one-tailed Figure 4.4, Panel 
top left) and in EXP 2 (rs(27)=.411, p=.013, one-tailed, Figure 4.4, Panel bottom left). During 
social foraging, no relationship was found between self-focus and the overall reward given to 
the charity in EXP 1 (r(24)=-.141, p=.246, one-tailed) and in EXP 2 (rs(27)=.164, p=.199, 
one-tailed), respectively. In addition self-focus was not associated with the overall amount of 
points across personal and social foraging (i.e., number of points obtain for themselves + 
number of points given to the charity) in EXP1 (r(24)=.178, p=.384) and EXP2 (rs(27)=.256, 
p=.181). Most importantly, the self-focus dimension was positively associated with the 
overall reward during personal minus social foraging in EXP 1 (r(24)=.413, p=.018, one-
tailed Figure 4.4., Panel top middle) and showed a trend in EXP 2 (r(27)=.294, p=.061, one-
tailed 4.4, Panel bottom middle). When adding the z-scores of personal minus social reward 
across both EXP 1 and EXP 2, self-focus was positively associated with amount of reward 
during personal foraging (r(23)=.529, p=.004, one-tailed Figure 4.4., Panel top right) as well 
as with the amount of reward during personal minus social foraging (r(23)=.463, p=.010, 
one-tailed, Figure 4.4., Panel bottom right)).  
To complement this approach, I also investigated whether the correlation coefficient 
of self-focus score and overall reward during personal foraging was significantly different 
from the correlation between the self-focus score and the overall reward during social 
foraging (Steiger, 1980). In EXP 1 (z=2.124, p=.016, one-tailed) and in EXP 2 (z=1.667, 
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p=.047, one-tailed), the two correlation coefficients were significantly different from each 
other. Finally, I checked whether the number of points obtained during personal foraging in 
EXP 1 was related to those obtained in EXP 2. The number of points in EXP 1 were not 
related to the number of apples in EXP 2 (rs(23)=.113, p=.225, one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Scatterplots depicting the associations between human-value orientation and 
overall reward obtained during personal and personal-social foraging. These depict a positive 
association between self-focused values and overall reward during personal foraging for EXP 
1 (top left), EXP 2 (top middle) and EXP1 & EXP2 combined (top right), as well as a 
positive association between self-focused values and overall reward during personal versus 
social foraging for EXP 1 (bottom left), EXP 2 (bottom middle) and EXP1 & EXP2 
combined (bottom right). I also tested and found that these self-focus-overall reward 
associations were significantly influenced by the variables signalling the overall foraging 
value (average foraging value in EXP 1, and exit threshold in EXP 2; see Supplementary 
Material 4.2). 
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Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Results 
I initially tested whether there was a positive association between task difficulty and 
dACC, as reported previously. This finding was replicated reliably (pFWE-CORR-
CLUSTER-level<.0005; t=8.79, MNI coordinates, x=6 y=22 z=44, k=59, Figure 4.5A, 
uncorrected cluster shown). After this initial check, the analyses probed the difference 
between personal and social (i.e., contrast self minus charity conditions) foraging (stage 1) 
and classical economic decision making (stage 2). Reflecting the absence of a statistically 
significant difference in the behavioural data, no brain region was differentially engaged in 
either stage 1 or stage 2 when contrasting the personal and the social conditions.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Replication analysis (A) and the investigation of the impact of the self-focus 
score on neural regions reflecting personal vs social foraging (B) and classical economic 
decision making (C) behaviour. Panel A shows dACC activation during foraging in response 
to task difficulty averaged across the personal and the social conditions. In Panel B, there is a 
negative lineal relationship between the self-focus score during foraging (Stage 1) for oneself 
compared to social foraging which included activation in a cluster compassing the dACC. In 
Panel C, there is a negative lineal relationship between the self-focus score during classical 
A B C 
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economic decision making (Stage 2) for oneself compared to charity which included 
activation in a big cluster encompassing the thalamus. 
Relating the Human Value Orientation to Personal > Social contrasts  
 I then investigated the neural mechanisms of the value-related behavioural effects. I 
probed how the self-focus score is associated with the neural activation of the difference 
between personal and social (i.e., contrast self minus other) foraging (stage 1) and economic 
decision making (stage 2). During Stage 1, self-focus was negatively related to activation in a 
large cluster encompassing dACC (PFWE-CORR-CLUSTER-level =.011, t=5.27, x=-2 y=6 
z=52 (x=-2 y=18 z=40, x=6 y=10 z=38), k=2655, Figure 4.5B, the 6,10,38 coordinates are 
shown). During Stage 2, self-focus was negatively related to activation in a big cluster 
thalamus (PFWE-CORR-CLUSTER-level <.0005, t=7.87, x=-6 y=-16 z=2 (x=10 y=-12 z=0, 
x=-48 y=-56 z=10), k=26534, Figure 4.5C). 
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Discussion 
The present study investigated the effect of self-focus on foraging behaviour by 
examining the role of human value orientations in personal and social foraging behaviour 
across two experiments. The results demonstrate, for the first time, a direct association 
between individual variation in values and the amount of reward earned when foraging for 
oneself, rather than on behalf of a charitable organization.  
Human values have been previously associated with personal and social point 
allocations in classical economic decision making in the context of charitable donations 
(Brosch et al., 2011). Specifically, Brosch et. al. (2011) found that self-centred participants 
kept more money for themselves instead of donating it to charity. The present experiments 
extend these findings by showing that self-focused value preferences have an effect on 
behaviour that extends beyond classical economic decision-making to the context of foraging 
decisions.  
From a social psychological perspective, the effect of self-focused values on foraging 
fits the nature of self-focused values (Schwartz et al., 2012). They include values that focus 
on openness to new experiences and challenging the status quo (e.g., “creativity,” “curiosity,” 
“freedom”), along with values that promote personal achievement (e.g., “wealth”, “success”, 
“power”).  Foraging is inherently about embracing the unknown, with risk but potentially 
high gains, which serve personal achievement even more when the foraging is for the self.  It 
therefore makes sense that individual differences in values can help to explain the substantial 
individual differences in foraging behaviour – the bases for which have not been examined in 
past research.  Apart from overall number of forages, the intercept of Stage 1 binary logistic 
regression, which reflects the overall tendency of the participant towards foraging or 
engaging (and this is related to the overall earnings, r(23)=.571, p=.003, two-tailed), can also 
be conceptualized as a status-quo marker. Again, there was no significant association 
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between the overall tendency to forage and openness values. In EXP 2, the variable reflecting 
status-quo is the harvest options (i.e., the number of apples to be obtained if participant 
choose to harvest the tree), while the option to travel to a new tree can be conceptualized as 
challenging the status-quo. The behavioural measures reflecting the extent to which 
participants are willing to challenge the status-quo are the overall number of times they travel 
to a new tree, but this variable was not significantly associated with Openness, and it was not 
even related to the overall earnings in the task in the first place. Thus, the behavioural effects 
do not appear to be accounted for by variation in openness.  
The second putative mechanism is more related to the value dimension self-
enhancement. In this account, people with high self-enhancement scores are more likely to 
earn more money during personal foraging because they spend more time (i.e., higher 
reaction time) trying to figuring out the optimal choice during the personal vs social foraging.  
In both EXP 1 and EXP 2, the reaction time was not related to self-enhancement scores, 
thereby casting doubt on this putative mechanism.  
Of importance, the design also allowed me to probe the neural underpinnings of these 
behavioural effects. Previous foraging studies found that the ACC is positively associated 
with the overall value of foraging (Kolling et al., 2012). However, this psychological function 
of the ACC was subsequently challenged (Shenhav et al., 2014) by showing that, when 
choice difficulty is properly controlled, ACC activity is no longer associated with the overall 
value of foraging (although there is an active debate on this account: Kolling et al., 2016; 
Shenhav et al., 2016); a result that replicated here. Moreover, the self-focus human value 
orientation score was negatively associated with the activation within the ACC during the 
foraging stage (personal vs social foraging), but not associated with classical economic 
decision making. The self-focus individuals who exhibited a higher bold-response within 
ACC when playing for charity relative to the self may have done so because playing for 
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charity may have been a more challenging task compared to playing for self. The reason for 
this may be the product of two opposing motivations 1) the lack of motivation to help others 
and 2) the social pressure to behave altruistically. I attempted to minimize this latter factor by 
informing participants that this was an anonymous study, but this may not have been 
adequate to significantly diminish the social pressure.  
A potential limitation of this study involves the threshold choice (i.e., a liberal 
primary threshold p=.01 and an extent threshold of k=50). Since this analysis was conducted, 
there has been increased focus on the appropriate balance in threshold setting between false 
negative and false positive errors (Eklund, Nichols & Knutson, 2016; Woo, Krishnan & 
Wager, 2014). The present thesis might incur criticism, but I still think that the threshold 
approach used is appropriate for a study of a novel paradigm due to its high sensitivity 
(Friston, Worsley, Frackowiak, Mazziotta & Evans, 1994; Smith & Nichols, 2009).  
Taken together, these results extend the psychological properties of ACC in foraging 
behaviour by providing a prosocial account for the activity of this region, while showing its 
connection to individual differences in human value orientations.  The findings expand the 
scope for understanding foraging behaviour to include the varied motivations expressed by 
values. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion. 
5.1. Results Summary 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which human values are 
reflected in human neurobiology. By employing methodologies in social-cognitive 
neuroscience, I associated individual variation in human values with a range of 
neurobiological indices, including genetic, brain structural and brain functional parameters. A 
second, related aim was to test whether the motivational relations within the value system 
itself (i.e., the relationship between the 10 human values) are also reflected in these 
neurobiological markers. Schwartz circumplex model of values predicts that an external 
variable should be associated with the human values in a sinusoidal waveform, underpinned 
by the motivational compatibilities and oppositions of human values. To meet this particular 
aim, I employed a recently developed as well as previously established sinusoidal tests. 
Taken together, the results of this thesis suggest that human values are indeed represented in 
all three aspects of biology tested. Moreover, the brain structural and genetic studies suggest 
that the motivational relations among human values are also represented in neurobiology.  
Taken together these various neurobiological findings suggest that human values, at 
least those that are included in the circumplex model of Schwartz, may have in part an 
evolutionary basis. There is the possibility that during the course of evolution humans may 
attempted to use various human values but some of those may have been extinct and some 
may have been conserved. The latter values, or at least some of them, may have been 
captured by the circumplex model of Schwartz. Moreover, throughout the course of evolution 
the values that have been evolutionary conserved may have started forming relationships 
between each other (e.g., incompatibilities) and the evolutionary marker of these relationships 
may have been captured by the sinusoidal association between human values scores and 
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different neurobiological markers presented in this thesis. Another potential contribution of 
the present thesis with respect to the evolutionary account of values and how can that may 
affect the updating of our social psychological models in light of the neural findings is the 
emerging possibility that some values may be more weighted at the neurobiological level 
than others. For example I have found that the human value type hedonism is very strongly 
associated with classical reward pathways (volume of left Globus Pallidus and 
microstructural properties of the Medial Forebrain Bundle) compared to other values types. 
This suggest that even though a set of values may be evolutionary conserved still some values 
may be more strongly associated to neurobiology than others. This piece of finding may help 
updating the psychological models of values in a number of ways. For example, new items in 
the human value scale can be added to interrogate the potential different components of 
hedonism and most importantly the content of these items should be based on the 
neuroscientific knowledge on classical reward pathways in the brain that has been 
accumulated over the years. However, I acknowledge that these above conclusions and 
suggestions are rather speculative considering the findings of the present thesis alone.   
With regard to the tests involving genetic markers, the current state of affairs at the 
time of present thesis was the converging evidence that individual variation in both human 
values and personality traits are underpinned by shared genetic variation. Despite this link, no 
specific genetic markers had been connected to human values. The first experimental chapter 
of the thesis tested the sinusoidal prediction of Schwartz’s Circumplex model of values 
utilising the polygenic score of neuroticism. After I replicated prior evidence (Genetics of 
Personality, 2015) of a polygenic contribution to neuroticism using a novel measure of the 
trait (using the HEXACO), I demonstrated that the whole human value spectrum is 
significantly associated with the polygenic score of neuroticism in a sinusoidal manner, as 
predicted by Schwartz’s value model, providing the first association between human values 
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and a specific genetic marker. This finding provides support for the evolutionary account (see 
General Introduction) of the 10 universal human value types, featured in Schwartz 
Circumplex model, and their relations, something that is particularly difficult to achieve when 
merely employing behavioural methodologies. Together, these results show that it is useful to 
include value orientations as relevant individual differences in polygenic contributions to 
neuroticism-related traits and that future research should consider values in investigations of 
polygenic contributions to other traits. Finally, this genetic finding also paved the way for an 
investigation of the biological mechanisms contributing to human value orientations which 
was the focus of the following experimental chapters. 
Similar to the polygenic neuroticism score, the overall white matter volume and 
myelin volume fraction (as well as some grey matter regions particularly within the frontal 
lobes), which have a strong genetic component (Kanai & Rees, 2011), were also significantly 
associated with the whole human value space in a sinusoidal manner as predicted by the 
Schwarz Circumplex model. Indeed the white matter associations are consistent with 
previous findings regarding the relationship between white matter and risk taking. A recent 
study (Jacobus et al., 2013) demonstrated that reduced white matter integrity in a number of 
brain regions (including fornix, superior corona radiata, superior longitudinal fasciculus, and 
superior fronto-occipital fasciculus) predicted substance use and risk-taking behaviours. 
Here, we complement these findings by showing that increased white matter volume is 
associated with self-enhancement and openness values, which are underlined by the need for 
control and mastery in one’s behaviour.  We further show, beyond simply looking at white-
matter volume, that the myelin content of white matter, as measured from the myelin volume 
fraction (Deoni et al., 2008) reveals a congruent pattern of association with values.  This 
result provides more information about the tissue composition of white matter, independent 
of volume (to which other parameters such as axon diameter and inter-axonal space can 
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contribute). Myelin enables faster and more efficient propagation of action potentials along 
axonal pathways, via regulating the speed and synchronicity of neuronal firing between 
cortical regions (Fields, 2008), which in turn can contribute to faster information processing 
capabilities (Turken et al., 2008). This might enable individuals to be more adapted to 
changing human environments, which may explain why increased myelination is associated 
with openness to change values. Of course, we cannot make any statements about causation. 
Value orientations might be associated with specific behavioural factors, such as physical 
activity, which is associated with increased myelination (Bracht et al., 2016), and future 
independent studies would be useful in clarifying whether such behavioural factors mediate 
the relationship between white matter and human values. Taken together, the genetic and 
brain structural data provide support for the circular structure of Schwartz value model, a 
support that spans different levels of neurobiology.  
Apart from testing the overall structure of human values (i.e., analysing all 10 human 
value types at a time), the other main aim of the thesis was to investigate the extent to which 
neurobiological markers are related to human values at the level of individual values types 
and value dimensions. In particular, building on previous work, I looked at the 
neurostructural underpinning of the value type hedonism and the behavioural and 
neurofucntional link between the value dimension personal-focus vs social-focus in two 
prosocial reward-relate experiments. With respect to the value type of hedonism, I found that 
the volume of the subcortical structure left globus pallidus as well as the microstructural 
properties of left medial forebrain bundle, a white matter tract connecting a number of 
reward-related structures including the left globus pallidus, are positively associated with the 
value type hedonism. The observed association between structural variability in the slMFB-
and hedonism complements previously established links between fronto-striatal and limbic-
striatal microstructural connectivity, striatal reward-related processing and personality traits 
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(Cohen, Schoene-Bake, Elger & Weber, 2009). For example, individual differences in 
novelty seeking were associated with the microstructural strength of connections between 
hippocampus, ventral striatum and midbrain, while the microstructural strength of the tracts 
between prefrontal cortex and striatum explained individual differences in reward 
dependence (Cohen et al., 2009). Furthermore, novelty seeking and the reward dependence 
temperaments were associated with fronto-striatal fiber connectivity (Lei et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in a DTI-fMRI study, fractional anisotropy of cortico-striatal fiber tracts was 
related to NAcc reward-related activation (Koch et al., 2014). 
At the level of value dimensions, this research studied the effect of 
selfishness/prosociality (i.e., value dimension personal focus vs social focus) on economic 
design making behaviour and neural activation in the context of charitable donations. Recent 
studies (Brosch et al., 2011) showed that human values are significant predictors of behaviour 
(i.e., point allocation) in a classical decision making task in the context of charitable 
donations. These studies showed that selfish participants kept more money for themselves 
than for a charity. Here, I extended the effect using a task that involved both a foraging stage 
and a classical economic decision making stage, as well as including a foraging task similar 
to those in the animal literature. Across both foraging tasks, self-focused individuals, 
compared to social-focused individuals, obtained more rewards when the foraging was for 
themselves or for themselves compared to the charity, but did not obtain more rewards when 
the foraging was simply for the charity. Most importantly, the higher level self-focus human 
value orientation score was negatively associated with the activation within the ACC during 
the foraging stage (personal vs social foraging). This evidence reveals a dynamic interplay 
between an evolutionarily entrenched decision making system and the higher order belief 
system of individuals.  
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All in all, these results showed that human values have an intricate link with classical 
neuroscience computations such as reward-related processing and economic decision making.  
Together, the findings further establish the diverse (i.e., spanning multiple levels) 
representation of human values in human neurobiology.  
 
5.2. Limitations 
A great number of the findings in the present thesis rely on novel statistical tests and 
methodologies.  Chief among these are the sinusoidal test of associations with the human 
value types and the inclusion of neurobiological markers, such as the polygenic neuroticism 
score and brain structural parameters. Despite the significantly more conservative nature of 
our novel sinusoidal approach (i.e., SFI, Hanel et al., 2016) compared to the previously 
established approaches (e.g., Boer & Fischer, 2013), there are still some issues to consider in 
its application. In particular, to be certain that an external variable (e.g., a genetic score or the 
volume of brain region) is associated with human value types in a sinusoidal manner, I 
recommend the following suggestion. In the sinusoidal test, the inputs to the statistical test 
are the 10 correlation coefficients between the external variable and the 10 human value 
types, but this does not take into account the variance of a particular coefficient (i.e., distance 
between the empirical correlation coefficient of the sample and the real correlation coefficient 
in the population). However, as far as I am aware, none of the currently available sinusoidal 
tests take the correlation coefficient variance (i.e., confidence intervals) into account. This 
point requires special attention because the empirical sinewave (black sinewave, Figure 5) 
may differ from the population sine wave (red sinewave, Figure 5, hypothetical), which may 
not be a sinewave at all. This point is illustrated in the following figure (Figure 5). This 
unresolved issue can be addressed in at least two ways. First, future sinusoidal tests should 
take as an input not only the correlation coefficients (i.e., 10 numbers) but also the confidence 
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intervals of each correlation coefficient and then utilise or control for this variance during the 
calculation of the fit. An alternative approach would be to independently replicate the effect 
of interest in a number of samples, and each correlation coefficient could be the mean 
correlation coefficient across samples, with error bars representing the spread across the 
samples. After this is done, the researcher can then run the SFI approach to test for 
significance. These methods would strengthen the test, although the strong a priori ordering 
of the values in the predicted sinusoidal waveform inspires confidence that the patterns of 
association are not merely occurring by chance (i.e., the wave would be perturbed by 
different real orderings which are not allowed for in the test), and the test remains an 
important advance beyond past methods.   
 
Figure 5. A methodological consideration for the Sinusoidal Fit Index. The empirical-sample 
(black line) and the population SFI may differ significantly. Error Bars are for demonstration 
purposes (fictitious).  Black dots= empirical correlation coefficients, Black line= empirical 
SFI, Red dots= population correlation coefficients, Red line= population SFI.  
95 
 
Lastly, in relation to the foraging research, a significant limitation is that participants’ 
choices may have been drastically different had they not felt the need to behave according to 
the social standards (i.e., act prosocially).  Indeed, it was previously shown that participants’ 
prosocial behaviour and corresponding neural activation when playing a similar economic 
decision-making game was significantly different depending on whether they were told that 
information about their choices are public or private.  To minimize the social desirability 
effect, we specifically informed participants that the data are stored anonymously. However, 
this does not ensure that social desirability effects were eliminated.  Congruent with abundant 
social psychological research utilising this method, social biases should have been attenuated, 
but it is not possible to be certain they were eliminated completely or sufficiently.  
Nevertheless, there is a question about mundane validity here: To extrapolate to the real 
world, total elimination of social desirability influences may not be untenable and raise its 
own limitations in interpretation. 
 Lastly, another limitation of this thesis is the fact human values were merely assessed 
via self-report items. This method poses some challenges because individuals might not 
accurately report their value orientation. Accuracy may be diminished for a variety of 
reasons, such as social desirability and not paying enough attention when completing the 
assessment tool. This can be somewhat corrected if the researcher replicates or extends the 
findings by using implicit measures of human values (for a review of implicit social cognition 
measures, see Nosek, Hawkins & Frazier, 2011) or other explicit measures similar to the 
Schwartz Value Scale, such as the Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001), 
which measures the same 10 value types.  
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5.3. Future Directions 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that individual variation in human values is 
associated with a range of neurobiology markers, including genetic, brain structural and brain 
functional parameters. However, a number of questions unanswered in this thesis can be 
investigated in the future work. For example, previous work (Brosch et al., 2011) showed that 
human values are associated with activation of reward-related regions of the brain in classical 
economic decision making tasks. Here, I found the value of hedonism is associated with the 
volume of left globus pallidus as well as with the microstructural properties of the left medial 
forebrain bundle, a white matter tract connecting a number of reward-related structures 
including the left globus pallidus. Given that the left medial forebrain bundle connects the 
reward-related areas found by Brosch et al (2011), future studies can investigate whether the 
effects of human values (and in particular hedonism) on reward-related neural activation is 
mediated/influenced by the integrity of the left medial forebrain bundle.   
Another unresolved issue of this thesis is the elucidation of the process whereby the 
polygenic score of neuroticism is associated with human values. A polygenic score is derived 
from the genome wide association study, and it reflects variation of the whole genome, which 
is significantly associated with the variable of interest (neuroticism in this case). As such, it is 
a non-specific specific biological marker, and it is thus very hard to characterize the exact 
nature of the biological connection between this score and human values. Future studies can 
investigate the human values in relation to more specific neuroticism-related markers, as they 
become available, which would ideally control well-characterized endophenotypes. Of 
course, another future direction would be to associate human values with the polygenic scores 
of other personality traits, especially extraversion, because this personality trait has been 
shown to be associated with the whole human values space in a sinusoidal way at the 
behavioural level (Parks-Leduc et al., 2015). Indeed, a polygenic score for extraversion (van 
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den Berg et al., 2016) has very recently been made available. Polygenic scores for well-being 
(Okbay et al., 2016) and depressive symptoms (Okbay et al., 2016) have also just become 
available. Similar to extraversion, previous studies showed a consistent link between well-
being and human values (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Oishi, Diener, Suh & Lucas, 1999; Sagiv 
& Schwartz, 2000), and this behavioural association can now be replicated and be extended at 
the genetic level. Lastly, future studies can interrogate the possibility whether the unique of 
HEXACO’s emotionality or the shared variance with Big Five’s extraversion is associated 
with human values in a sinusoidal way.   
5.4. Final Conclusion 
In sum, the present thesis tested the hypothesis that human values and the 
relationships between human values are represented at different levels of biology. I showed 
that individual variation in human values is associated with genetic, neurostructural and 
neurofunctional measures. Moreover, I demonstrated that the intrinsic patterns of associations 
within the value system itself, as predicted by Schwartz’s circumplex model, are also linked 
to different levels of neurobiology.  These data provide support for the circumplex structure 
of Schwartz’s model and lay the foundation for future investigations into the neurobiology of 
values.  
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Supplementary Material 
Supplementary Material 2.1. Cronbach’s alpha for each of the 10 values (experimental 
chapters 2 & 3). 
Value Number of items Cronbach’s α 
Universalism  7 .76 
Benevolence 9 .76 
Tradition 6 .63 
Conformity 4 .63 
Security 6 .68 
Power 5 .79 
Achievement 6 .67 
Hedonism 2 .74 
Stimulation 3 .79 
Self-direction 6 .65 
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Supplementary Material 2.2. Correlation coefficients between the 9 value types (x-axis, 
Conformity, Tradition, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, 
Power, Security) and NS. 
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Supplementary Material 2.3. Replication of sinusoidal results using previously established 
methods.  
Apart from the sinusoidal approach discussed here, two alternative methods (Roccas et al. 
2002; Boer & Fischer, 2013) for testing whether an external variable (e.g., PNS) is associated 
with the whole value space were utilised in the prior work.  The method used in Roccas et al 
(2002) is composed of three steps. First, researchers derive hypotheses regarding the 
strongest positive and strongest negative correction between the external variable and the 10 
value types. For example, in the case of extraversion discussed in their paper, it was 
hypothesized that the strongest positive correlation was with Stimulation and the strongest 
negative with Tradition. Next, researchers specify the expected order of correlations by 
assigning numbers 1 to 10 to the ten human values, with 1 assigned to the value with the 
strongest positive correlation and 10 to the value with the most negative correlation following 
the circular model (e.g., Stimulation=1, Hedonisms and Achievement=2, Self-direction and 
Power=4.5, Security and Universalism=6.5, Benevolence, Conformity=8.5, Tradition=10).  
After this is done, the researcher performs a spearman correlation correlating the expected 
orders of correlations (step 2) with the observed order of correlation (i.e., empirical 
correlations). A significant correlation suggests that the external variable is associated with 
the whole value space as predicted by Schwartz’s circular model of values. By assigning the 
following values in step 2 (Stimulation=1, Hedonisms and Self-direction=3.5, Universalism 
and Achievement=6, Benevolence and Power=8, Security=9 and Conformity and 
Tradition=10), I replicated the PNS (rs=.8, p=.008) and NS (rs=.5, p=.112) findings using this 
approach. The exact same results also occur when assigning slightly different values in step 2 
(Stimulation=1, Hedonisms and Self-direction=3, Universalism and Achievement=5, 
Benevolence and Power=7.5, Security=9 and Conformity and Tradition=10). The second 
approach discussed in Boer and Fischer (2013) tests four correlation patterns (i.e., two 
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prototypical correlation patterns including the reversed patterns). The first pattern is termed 
SET-shape consistency, and it indicates that correlations with the external variable are 
highest for self-transcendence values, lowest for self-enhancement values, while the 
correlations with other values are in between. Similar to the first pattern, the second pattern is 
termed OC-shape consistency, and it indicates that correlations with the external variable are 
highest for openness values, lowest for conservation values, while the correlations with other 
values are in between. Each of the correlation patterns are assigned the output statistic, which 
is a number that ranges from -1 to 1. An absolute value greater of .4 indicates a small value 
consistent, .6 a medium value consistency and .8 a large value consistency. Again, I 
replicated the findings using this approach for PNS (SET-Shape=-.40, OC-Shape=.88). 
However, this latter approach deemed the correlation pattern of NS also significant (SET-
Shape=-.47, OC-Shape=.74).  
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Supplementary Material 2.4. Pearson correlation coefficients between PNS and NS with the 
10 human values (Conformity, Tradition, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, 
Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security). 
 CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO SE 
PNS .208 .073 -.035 -.155 -.163 -.180 -.146 .099 .139 .023 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
.067 .518 .758 .166 .145 .108 .196 .383 .216 .840 
NS .048 -.020 .189 -.242* -.299** -.285** -.088 .192 .230* .111 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.673 .860 .091 .029 .007 .010 .437 .090 .039 .327 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.1. Schwartz’s (1992) 10 value types and their principal values 
(adapted from Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung & Rees, 2009). 
Value Type Definition Values 
Power  Social status and prestige, control or 
dominance over people 
and resources 
 
Social power, wealth, authority, 
preserving my public image 
Achievement  Personal success through demonstrating 
competence according to social standards 
Successful, ambitious, capable, influential 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself Pleasure, enjoying life 
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life A varied life, daring, an exciting life 
Self-direction Independent thought and action-choosing, 
creating, exploring 
Creativity, freedom, independent, curious, 
choosing own 
goals 
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection for the 
welfare of all 
Broadminded, wisdom, a world of beauty, 
equality, unity with nature, a world at 
peace, social justice, protecting the 
environment 
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare 
of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact 
Honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, 
responsible 
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion provide the 
self 
Respect for tradition, humble, accepting 
my portion in life, devout, moderate 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses 
likely to upset 
or harm others and violate social expectations 
or norms 
Self-discipline, obedient, politeness, 
honoring of parents and elders 
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, 
relationships, and self 
Family security, national security, 
reciprocation of favors, social order, clean 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.2. Multidimensional Scaling Analyses  
3.1.2.1. Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Multi-dimensional scaling analysis of 56 items.  
 
3.1.2.2. Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Multi-dimensional scaling analysis of 10 values. 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.3. Correlation coefficients between the 10 value types and the 
white matter volume (Panel A) and myelin volume fraction (Panel B). Unlike Figure 3 and 4, 
here I control for the potential confound of intelligence by regressing out of each individual 
value the effect of all the MATRICS domains including the total score (i.e., speed of 
processing, attention/vigilance, working memory, verbal learning, visual learning, reasoning 
and problem solving, social cognition and the total score).  
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Supplementary Material 3.1.4. Parameters of brain regions that correlate with the social 
values scores in a sinusoidal fashion (SFI=goodness of fit). A. Left thickness of caudal 
middle frontal (SFI=.07), B. Left thickness of lateral orbitofrontal (SFI=.17), C. Left volume 
isthmus cingulate (SFI=.10), D. Left volume lateral occipital (SFI=.16), E. Left volume 
superior parietal (SFI=.02) and F. Right volume superior parietal (SFI=.10). 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.5. Replication of the sinusoidal finding using the Boer and 
Fischer (2013) method.  
Despite the fact that the SFI approach is a more rigorous and conservative approach than 
Boer and Fischer’s method (2013), it nevertheless revealed the same conclusions.  That is, 
their method also brought out the association between values and white matter volume as 
well as with myelin volume fraction. The approach discussed in Boer and Fischer (2013) tests 
four correlation patterns (i.e., two prototypical correlation patterns including the reversed 
patterns). The first pattern is termed SET-shape consistency, and it indicates that correlations 
with the external variable are highest for self-transcendence values, lowest for self-
enhancement values, while the correlations with other values are in between. Similarly to the 
first pattern, the second pattern is termed OC-shape consistency, and it indicates that 
correlations with the external variable are highest for openness values, lowest for 
conservation values, while the correlations with other values are in between. Each of the 
correlation patterns are assigned an output statistic, which is a number that ranges from -1 to 
1. An absolute value greater than .4 indicates a small value consistency, .6 a medium value 
consistency and .8 a large value consistency.  
 shapeSET shapeOC 
White matter volume -.80 -.23 
Myelin volume fraction -.66 -.38 
White matter volume 
(MATRICS regressed out) 
-.77 -.26 
Myelin volume fraction 
(MATRICS regressed out) 
-.55 -.53 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.6. The 32 cortical labels (per hemisphere) of the DKT 
(Desikan-Killiany-Tourville (DKT) protocol to define the regions of interest (ROI) in the 
analysis. 
 
1) caudal anterior cingulate 17) pars orbitalis 
2) caudal middle frontal  18) pars triangularis 
3) cuneus  19) pericalcarine 
4) entorhinal  20) postcentral 
5) fusiform  21) posterior cingulate 
6) inferior parietal  22) precentral 
7) inferior temporal  23) precuneus 
8) isthmus cingulate  24) rosterior anterior cingulate 
9) lateral occipital  25) rostral middle frontal 
10) lateral orbitofrontal  26) superior frontal 
11) lingual  27) superior parietal 
12) medial orbitofrontal  28) superior temporal 
13) middle temporal  29) supramarginal 
14) parahippocampal  30) transverse temporal 
15) paracentral  
16) pars opecularis 
31) insula 
32) frontal pole 
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Supplementary Material 3.1.7. Frontal regions of interest: frontal pole, medial orbital 
frontal, rostral middle frontal, lateral orbital frontal  
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Material 3.1.8. Voxel-based morphometry results representing negative 
associations between value dimensions and white matter across the whole brain. 
Value Dimension  Coordinates Cluster size Cluster level  Peak Level T value 
Conservation -22 -54 4 1 .044 .047 4.80 
Self-Transcendence  60 -37 -11  30 .015 .009 4.87 
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Supplementary Material 3.2.1. Coronal sections showing the segmented subcortical regions 
and white and grey matter (x=coronal slice, Montreal Neurological Institute space) 
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Supplementary Material 3.2.2. Correlation coefficients between the ten human values 
(CO=Conformity, TR=Tradition, BE=Benevolence, UN=Universalism, SD= Self-direction, 
ST=Stimulation, HE=Hedonism, AC=Achievement, PO=Power, SE=Security) and the 14 
subcortical structures (left and right: globus pallidus, thalamus, caudate nucleus, putamen, 
hippocampus, amygdala, nucleus accumbens), as well as with several fractional anisotropy 
and myelin volume fraction indices (wm: restricted to white matter mask, wb=whole brain, #: 
controlling for age, gender and overall fractional anisotropy within the white matter mask, +: 
controlling for age, gender, and overall fractional anisotropy).  
 CO TR BE UN HE SD ST AC PO SE 
           
L_Thalamus 0.033 -0.011 0.064 -0.127 0.105 -0.054 0.021 -0.026 -0.091 0.15 
R_Thalamus 0.032 -0.055 -0.084 -0.119 0.192 -0.088 0.114 0.027 0.041 0.109 
L_Caudate -0.088 -0.08 -0.052 0.078 0.149 0.055 0.041 0.145 -0.113 -0.036 
R_Caudate -0.035 -0.038 0.002 0.129 0.144 0.021 0.03 0.018 -0.099 -0.08 
L_Putamen -0.076 -0.002 -0.106 -0.059 0.053 -0.101 0.142 -0.005 0.188 -0.02 
R_Putamen -0.037 0.033 -0.129 -0.025 -0.005 -0.144 0.13 -0.079 .217* 0.044 
L_Pallidum 0 -0.182 -0.021 -0.152 .393** 0.036 .231* 0.083 -0.058 0.002 
R_Pallidum -0.1 -0.152 0.085 -0.125 .218* 0.001 0.052 0.014 0.039 -0.035 
L_Hippocampus 0.042 0.042 -0.062 -0.003 -0.021 -0.105 0.096 -0.007 -0.004 0.014 
R_Hippocampus -0.035 0.073 -0.023 0.024 0.072 -0.134 0.183 -0.048 -0.004 0.082 
L_Amygdala -0.142 -0.029 -0.068 0.073 -0.124 -0.069 0.033 0.036 0.205 -0.115 
R_Amygdala 0.084 -0.002 -0.081 -0.013 -0.15 0.014 -0.038 0.077 0.045 -0.046 
L_Accumbens  0.075 0.166 0.061 -0.13 -0.09 -0.038 -0.056 -0.053 0.012 -0.016 
R_Accumbens  -0.092 -0.079 -0.115 0.018 0.114 0.072 0.055 0.179 0.091 -0.182 
L_MVF_wm 0.061 0.09 0.035 -0.198 .245* -0.163 0.06 0.134 0.038 0.032 
R_MVF_wm -0.058 0.012 0.153 -0.027 .220* -0.089 0.041 0.011 -0.004 0.049 
L_MVF_wb 0.013 0.021 0.066 -0.2 .312** -0.142 0.051 0.108 0.03 0.145 
R_MVF_wb -0.066 -0.049 0.122 -0.064 .266* -0.067 0.041 0.023 -0.013 0.155 
L_FA_wm# 0.007 0.106 -0.001 -0.176 0.107 -0.042 0.144 0.145 0.001 -0.062 
R_FA_wm# -0.042 0.091 0.105 -0.027 0.056 -0.031 0.112 -0.014 -0.096 0.006 
L_FA_wb+ -0.037 0.087 0.007 -0.211 0.136 -0.051 0.091 0.157 0.034 0.003 
R_FA_wb+ -0.062 0.072 0.098 -0.058 0.071 -0.032 0.068 0 -0.075 0.058 
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01  (2-tailed).          
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Supplementary Material 3.2.3. Raw value distribution of all 10 human values  
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Conformity 86 .75 7.00 4.4913 1.20321 
Tradition 86 .17 5.67 2.5891 1.26664 
Benevolence 87 2.50 6.63 5.0848 .85643 
Universalism 87 2.44 6.89 4.9757 1.01120 
Self- Direction 87 3.17 7.00 5.3257 .86150 
Stimulation 87 1.33 7.00 4.8199 1.36948 
Hedonism 87 2.00 7.00 5.5517 1.08648 
Achievement 86 2.40 7.00 5.1186 1.02228 
Power 87 -.80 6.60 2.5011 1.41318 
Security 87 1.29 6.71 4.7274 1.03237 
Valid N (listwise) 85 
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Supplementary Material 3.2.4. A scatterplot depicting the association between hedonism 
and the left minus right GP volume.  
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Supplementary Material 4.1. Instructions to participants for the foraging Exp1 (4.1.1.) and 
Exp2 (4.1.2.).  
Before reading the instructions and performing the practise sessions participants were told 
that they will be playing a game with the goal to maximize the number of points (Exp1) or 
apples (Exp2), which would be converted into real money at the end. In addition, participants 
were apprised that they will be playing these games for themselves for half of the trials and 
for a charity of their choice for the other half. Participant could select a different charity in 
Exp2. The list of charities was the following: British Red Cross, Save the Children Fund, The 
Salvation Army, Oxfam, Cancer Research, and Macmillan Cancer Support. 
 
4.1.1. The instructions for EXP 1 were as follows. 
“Thank you for participating. Today you will be earning money above pay/credits from 
coming in. It will be in the form of points shown in a reward bar. These points will turn into 
cash at the end of the experiment. Please press any key to continue.  
You are now going to begin the main task  
You will see a blue bar fill up to a golden line as you collect rewards. Each time you fill that 
bar we will add £0.20 to your final compensation.  
Each trial of this task will involve two stages:  
In stage 2 you will be choosing between two randomly chosen numbers at a time that are 
each GAMBLES. These numbers represent the amount of reward you get if the gamble wins. 
These numbers will each have a probability of winning between 20% and 90%. We will show 
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you a purple bar next to each number that represents the probability of getting the reward for 
that number. The purple bars will perfectly represent the probability of winning for each 
symbol, and these probabilities will be assigned at RANDOM before each trial (i.e., they will 
have nothing to do with the amount of reward you can get from each number). 
 
This all means that if you choose a certain number there is a chance that you will not receive 
the reward associated it, and that it will not necessarily benefit you to just choose the number 
associated with higher reward on each trial. On any given trial, it is possible that NEITHER, 
ONE, or BOTH gambles will be successful, but you will only the reward for the number you 
chose if it is successful.  
Stage 1 takes place before you get to see the probabilities.  
During Stage 1 you will simply see the two numbers you could choose between in the middle 
of the screen. You will ALSO see six other numbers in a box at the top of the screen.  
At this stage you can press the A key to choose to swap out the two numbers you were given 
for two others from that box. When you do this, two numbers will be randomly chosen for 
that box and the two numbers previously in the middle will go into the box.    
You can swap from this box as many times as you’d like. However, there is a cost for each of 
these swaps. The number of points you would lose is determined by the number to the left of 
the box.  
Whenever you decide you want to stick with the number in the middle of the screen you can 
press the S key. You will then be shown the probabilities for each number and choose 
between them.  
 
133 
 
You will choose between numbers in the middle by pressing the K for the LEFT number and 
the L key for the RIGHT number. After you make a choice you will see the outcome of 
BOTH gambles. A plus (+) will appear next to each gamble that was successful (i.e., the 
purple bar beat the probability that was chosen), and an X will appear next to each one that 
was unsuccessful.  
If the gamble you chose won, those points will be added to the reward bar. If you were 
unsuccessful, the bar will stay the same. 
Note that each time you choose to swap for a new set of numbers or to make a choice 
between the numbers in front of you, there will be a few seconds delay before moving on to 
the next part of the trial. This is normal. You will get a better sense for all of this when you 
do the practice, but one thing to keep in mind is that the only time you will be able to make a 
response is when you see question mark (?) in the middle of the screen. 
Finally, remember that the only time you can get rewards on this task is during the SECOND 
stage choice. There are a FIXED number of times total (200) that you will get to make this 
choice, meaning that you will not get the opportunity for more of these choices if you decide 
to swap more or fewer times during the first stage. These swaps will only affect which 
numbers you ultimately choose between, not how many times you will have an opportunity 
for reward.” 
 
4.1.2. 
The instructions for EXP2 were as follows.  
“Thank you for participating!  For the next 30 minutes you will be asked to make choices that 
can earn you money.      
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In this game, you are in an orchard where you visit trees to harvest apples. You have a limited 
amount of time in the orchard and you need to decide whether to spend this time harvesting  
apples at a tree or moving to a brand new tree. Some trees produce more apples than others 
and each apple is worth money. Your goal is to earn as many apples (money) as possible.    
On each trial you will see a tree.  You can decide to harvest apples by pressing the Down 
arrow or move to a  new tree by pressing the Right arrow.      
Harvesting apples takes up some time but earns you money. However, you will tend to find 
that the more times you harvest apples at a tree the fewer apples it produces.  Each time you 
harvest, the tree will produce only a fraction of the apples you earned on the previous turn     
Going to a new tree also takes up time but the new tree has never been visited and so has a 
full supply of apples. There is an endless supply of new trees in each orchard, and you will 
never return to an already visited/harvested tree.    
You have a limited amount of time to harvest apples in each orchard and this time starts  
counting down when you start the game. Harvesting apples takes time and each harvest  
decision results in fewer apples produced by  that tree. Going to a new tree takes time but the 
tree has not been depleted by apple picking. Your goal is to tradeoff time spent harvesting  
and time spent moving to a new tree.    
When the circle at the bottom of the tree turns white you should enter your decision to 
harvest apples (Down arrow) or move to a new tree (Right arrow).  You won't have long to 
make a choice!     
If you don't respond in time, you miss a turn. The more turns you miss, the less time you have 
left in the game to  harvest apples and you will collect  less apples (money).       
A time out looks like this:  “Time Out!” ; 
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You will harvest apples in different orchards.  Some orchards have spread out trees and it 
takes longer to reach a new tree. Other orchards are more packed together and it takes less 
time to reach a tree.  You will spend a limited and equal amount of time in each type of 
orchard.      
The time it takes to go to a new tree can only change when you switch to a new orchard.  
Once in an orchard, the time it takes to  go to a new tree does not change.   You will know 
when you switch orchards by a change of color, a message and a short break.    
You will notice that at some trees you will harvest a larger initial number of apples than at 
others. The quality of any given tree is random but the likelihood of a good, bad, or  average 
tree never changes. It is unrelated to which orchard you are in or the physical appearance of 
the tree.    
When you harvest apples you may also get portions of whole apples. These are still worth 
money but at a fraction of a whole apple. You earn the apples on the screen after each 
harvest.  Your goal is to earn as many apples (money) as possible. Your earnings are totaled  
throughout and paid to you at the end.  Every decision counts!    
SUMMARY:  * Limited and equal time per orchard  * Tradeoff time harvesting vs. switching 
trees  * Number of apples produced by each tree  varies the same way in every orchard  * 
Harvesting apples depletes the supply  in the same way in every orchard  * Time to go to a 
new tree changes only when  you switch orchards  * Nothing changes until you switch 
orchards  * The apples you earn on every choice count!    
Remember, you can earn more by noticing how:   * the apples you earn decrease as you 
harvest from the same tree  * the quality of the trees varies  * long it takes to go to a new tree  
or harvest apples.    
You are now ready to try a short practice session      
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Supplementary Material 4.2: Personal foraging analyses   
Given the effect of individual variability in self-focus on rewards during personal and 
social foraging, we investigated whether the average foraging value (i.e., the reward 
participants would earn if they choose to forage in a given trial) has an impact on the 
relationship between self-focus and reward. These analyses tested whether the effect of self-
focus was significantly weakened when the overall foraging value variables were added into 
the regression model.  
In EXP 1, the estimate signalling the average value of foraging was the average of the 
6 numbers in the box (Figure 2), and the impact of that estimate on participants’ decisions 
was the corresponding beta-weights from the logistic regression (Figure 3). Indeed, the 
standardized self-focus coefficient changed from significant (β=413, p=.036) to 
nonsignificant (β=.308, p=.103), while the standardized coefficient of the average forage 
value during personal foraging was still significant in the multiple regression model (β=.381, 
p=.046) predicting number of points during personal foraging. More interestingly, the 
standardized self-focus coefficient changed from significant (β=413, p=.036) to 
nonsignificant (β=.225, p=.157) ,while the standardized coefficient of the average forage 
value during personal minus social foraging was still significant in the multiple regression 
model (β=.609, p=.001) predicting number of points during personal minus social foraging.  
In EXP 2, the variable that reflects how participants’ decisions are influenced in 
response to the average foraging value is the exit threshold. We focused our analysis on the 
second visit of each environment, to eliminate the learning confound. (Of note, the reason we 
include all visits in EXP1 was because EXP1 is not a learning task). Similar to EXP 1, the 
self-focus coefficient changed from significant (β=.372, p=.047) to insignificant (β=.191, 
p=.305), while the coefficient of the average forage value was still significant in the multiple 
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regression model (β=-.429, p=.026), during the personal foraging but not during the personal 
minus social foraging.  
 
 
 
